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美国种族简史 读书笔记3： 德国移民制造了现代美国？ 语文书斋 到处停留的叶子 2012-2-11 2 3787 猪头大将 2012-2-12 00:56
美国种族简史 读书笔记4 德国移民的历史1 语文书斋 到处停留的叶子 2012-2-11 8 5525 草蜢 2012-2-17 03:23
美国种族简史 读书笔记5： 德国移民的历史 语文书斋 到处停留的叶子 2012-3-23 3 3134 到处停留的叶子 2012-3-24 04:43
【读书笔记】阳春面与长马甲 语文书斋 路人癸 2013-1-24 0 2228 路人癸 2013-1-24 19:44
《投资最重要的事》读书笔记（2）关于风险 黑虎帮 就爱抬杠 2014-2-17 1 175 高买低卖 2014-2-17 23:03
信心铭 中英文对照的理解（更新完毕） attach_img 语文书斋 到处停留的叶子 2014-11-13 39 11169 到处停留的叶子 2014-12-2 07:39
读书：斯巴达 attach_img 沁园春茶馆 qyangroo 2014-12-2 1 27 龙血树 2014-12-2 11:57
欧洲穆斯林化与西方的衰落 网林摘葩 洗心 2015-1-12 33 7395 孟词宗 2015-2-14 01:13
哥伦布到达之前的美洲大陆 attach_img digest 酒庄 Dracula 2015-4-9 50 218 楚天 2015-4-11 20:07
莫干山读书笔记－杰克豪雅的“计时人生” 语文书斋 dasa 2015-12-7 5 1562 dasa 2015-12-22 13:35
《中国哲学简史》读书笔记 叶子的小院 到处停留的叶子 2016-7-10 13 115 海天 2017-4-18 07:27
视觉的感悟 语文书斋 到处停留的叶子 2017-2-19 3 5551 到处停留的叶子 2017-2-19 12:40
理想主义者的炮灰情节——《人民的名义》读后 attach_img 语文书斋 xiejin77 2017-5-27 6 4666 勤劳工作的猪 2017-6-4 20:58
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分享 微观经济学读书笔记1：贸易可以使每个人的状况都变得更好 —— 中美贸易 ...
热度 1 gordon 2017-4-19 01:48
在曼昆的《经济学原理：微观经济学分册》中，提到了经济学的十大原理，其中第五条：贸易可以使每个人的状况都变得更好，是一条很有意思的理论。举一个例子来看看就知道了。 假设世界上只有两个人，一个牧牛人和一个种土豆的农夫，他们都可以生产牛肉和土豆，但他们两个的能力有所不同，牧牛人是个强人，他生产土豆和牛肉的能力都要强于农夫， 在这样的生产能力下，为了自给自足，农夫每天花 8 小时生产 4 单位的牛肉和 16 单位的土豆，而牧牛人每天花 8 个小时生产 12 单位的牛肉和 24 单位的土豆。 可以看出，牧牛人生产两种商品所花的时间都强于农夫，那么如果牧牛人与农夫交易的话，其结果如何？不论哪种商品，牧牛人自己做肯定都要比农夫成本低，那么交易中牧牛人是否吃亏了呢？ 这里假设牧牛人以 1 单位牛肉换 3 单位土豆的价格，与农夫进行交易，前提是农夫只生产土豆，而他则减少土豆的生产，将更多的时间用以生产牛肉，每天交易 5 单位牛肉，那么结果及比较是怎样的呢？ 结 果已经很明显了，通过贸易，农夫和牧牛人每天所能拥有的牛肉和土豆都增加了，这真的是不可思议的事情，虽然牧牛人很强（生产成本低），但在交易中他同样能 够得到超出自己能力的收益，也就是说， 再强的人，通过交易也可以获利 ，能力弱的人也可以获利，这是个真正意义上的“共赢”。 *********************************************************************** 为了解释这种现象，我们先引入几个概念： 1 ，绝对优势：用比另一个生产者更少的投入生产某种物品的能力，上面的例子中，牧牛人就是拥有绝对优势的一方，他生产土豆和牛肉的投入都比农民少。 2 ，机会成本：为了得到某种东西而必须放弃的东西，上面的例子中，牧牛人生产一单位牛肉所需要的时间是 20 分钟，而这 20 分钟如果他用来生产土豆，则可以生产 2 单位，那么他生产 1 单位牛肉的机会成本就是 2 单位土豆，以此类推，可以得出农夫和牧牛人的机会成本 3 ，比较优势：一个生产者以低于另一个生产者的机会成本生产一种物品的行为。从上表中我们可以看出，牧牛人生产 1 单位牛肉的机会成本要低于农夫， 他在生产牛肉上具有比较优势 ，而农夫生产 1 单位土豆的机会成本也要低于牧牛人，他在生产土豆上具有比较优势。 从 上面的例子中我们可以看出，一个人可以在生产所有物品上都拥有绝对优势，却不可能在生产所有物品上都具有比较优势，而专业化和贸易的好处就是基于比较优势 的，因为每个人都具有自己的比较优势，于是交易就变得有利可图了， 其奥妙就在于，用于交易的商品，其价格一定是低于自己生产的机会成本的 ，例如对于农夫， 他买 1 单位牛肉需要付出的代价是 3 单位的土豆，而如果他自己生产，则机会成本是 4 单位，这中间 1个 单位的差值，其实就是他在交易中获得的利益，反之，对于牧牛人也一样。 这其实就是经济学的十大原理之一：贸易可以使社会上每个人都获利，因为它使人们可以专门从事他们具有比较优势的活动，也就是我们常说的，专业的人做专业的事，这样是利益最大化的。 这里面其实还有个定价的奥妙，也就是前面没讲的， 为什么牧牛人给出的价格是 1 单位牛肉换 3 单位的土豆呢？ 其实这也是跟机会成本息息相关的，牧牛人生产牛肉的机会成本是 2 单位土豆，农夫生产牛肉的机会成本是 4 单位土豆，那么这个定价一定是在 2 ～ 4 之间的某个数值，这样双方都能获利， 如果定价低于 2 单位土豆，那么大家都会去买牛肉 （因为这个价格低于两个人的机会成本），如果定价高于 4 单位土豆，那么大家都会去卖牛肉（因为这个价格高于两个人的机会成本），但事实是这是个两个人的交易，必须有一个买方一个卖方，不能都是买方或者都是卖方，这就是定价的道理。
191 次阅读|1 个评论
分享 随便说说：开启读书计划
热度 24 烛影摇红 2016-8-23 07:40
昨天浏览了最新出炉的获奖科幻作品：《北京折叠》。 早晨在车里我还在思考这个问题：不清楚自己到底处于第几空间。 为了不至于栖息第三空间，虽然也挤不进第二空间吧，我决定好好学习天天向上。 诸君也不用对于期许太高，我读的肯定都是普及读物，就我的认知水平能把通俗读物读下去就不错了。 所以本周设定第一本书：《斯坦福极简经济学》。 下周争取写读书笔记。
个人分类: 碎语|147 次阅读|7 个评论
分享 读书笔记——《投资最重要的事》（1）
热度 4 就爱抬杠 2014-2-16 10:45
买股票就是买未来，但其实决定投资者业绩的不是公司的未来，而是投资者对公司未来的预期和公司现实之间的差距与市场整体对公司未来业绩的预期和现实之间的差距间的差距，是要对预期“求导”。所谓第二层次思维，大概也是这个意思。 要战胜市场，就必须有自己的非共识性预测。然而，非共识性预测是难以作出，难以正确作出，更重要的，它难以执行。 可控的实验，可以复制的结果，可以确定的因果关系在经济学乃至在投资中，几乎不存在。一切都是概率。幅度、时间和概率三者不能同时测准，这就是股市的测不准原理。 价值型投资者相信当前价值高于当前价格（即便未来增长有限），成长型投资者相信未来价值高于当前价格（即便当前价格高于价值）。因而，真正的选择不在价值与成长之间，而在当前价值与未来价值之间。成长型投资者关注未来，价值型投资者关注当下，但不可避免地要面对未来。
485 次阅读|0 个评论
分享 读书笔记：《教养大震撼》
热度 14 无漏 2013-5-19 23:00
今天匆匆翻完《教养大震撼》一书，做点读书笔记 一、关于表扬 1.表扬孩子时，少夸孩子聪明，否则等于是在告诉他们，为了保持聪明，不要冒可能犯错的险，不夸聪明，实际是给他空间能对自己的天赋做出评价 2.一个人只有做到他想要做的事情之后，才能建立自尊 点评：体会太深，完全赞同 二、关于睡眠 1.少睡/晚睡会极大地影响孩子的成绩与情绪；赖床给孩子好成绩和积极情绪 2；睡眠不足的人总是想起不愉快的记忆，却很容易想起消极的记忆 点评：觉得很有可能有道理，在自己身上吻合度高，印象中初中时晚上7点我就瞌睡了，但被老爸强制着最起码到8点才让睡觉 三、关于歧视与平等 1.文化中越强调张扬个性，孩子越容易形成小团体 2.对于青少年来说，归属于某个团体带来的安全感非常重要 点评：似乎有道理 四、关于撒谎 1.96%的孩子都会撒谎，如果告诉孩子说真话会让父母高兴，孩子会开始打消撒谎的念头；同时应该告诉孩子撒谎是错误的 2.童年的谎言影响深远，是对“我是一个好孩子”自我概念的极大挑战 3.在学会撒谎前，他们已经会告状了，父母对于“不要总是告状”的回应，正是小孩有事不和爸妈讲的开始 点评：试试看，坦然面对撒谎，积极引导孩子不撒谎 五、关于智商和情商 1. 11,12岁时，智商才相对稳定；越聪明的孩子，智商变化幅度越大 点评：有结论，但是没有提供关于如何提高智商的论述，需要继续挖掘资料 六、关于社交能力 1.相比与兄弟姐妹，与同伴更能学习到人际沟通技能呢 2.角色扮演游戏是孩子社交技能的最佳体现 点评：逻辑合理，对独生子女父母是个安慰 七、关于管教 1.制定规则与孩子叛逆无关，管的太严的孩子不反抗，只是不快乐；对父母权威的逆反在十四五岁达到顶峰，宽容放任不是成功的教育方式 2、孩子说真话的真正动机，是指望父母能让步，争吵是好事，说明诚实；青少年通常觉得争吵是一种有机会听到父母真实想法的有益方式，是否伤感情取决于父母是否讲道理 点评：a、和我现在理念一致，规则执行比制定难，所以规则不能过多，抓大放小； b、做好闺女同自己吵架的准备 八、学习的自制力 1.角色扮演游戏可以培养孩子的专注力，专注力，对于学习成绩和学习动机大有帮助 2.让孩子圈出自己作业本里哪些字写的好，可以锻炼自我分析和判断力；严格要求孩子自己对照正确答案检查作业，并和同组小朋友互查，对于形成良好的自我意识极其关键 点评：1不妨一试，2与我现行理念同，初步得到过印证 九、关于攻击性行为 1.父母吵架不口出恶言，最后重归于好（建设性冲突），长期下来，可以提高孩子的安全感，使之更合群 2.贴心奶爸比传统奶爸更容易教出问题孩子 点评：1符合逻辑，2贴心奶爸很有可能是知道不能做什么但不知道该做什么导致规则执行度差，所以懒虫说的好，多看哲学书，育儿书不用看太多
个人分类: 杂|99 次阅读|5 个评论
分享 周日笔记：唱歌和读书笔记
热度 18 到处停留的叶子 2013-4-29 05:54
唱歌 唱歌是叶子最近的爱好，尤其是有感而发的唱歌。 上个礼拜韦红雪的麦克，不爱的老男孩，还有阿姨回来唱的两首歌，都触动到了我。 今日下午送了女儿去中文学校，我把昨天傍晚唱的《蝴蝶》贴了出来。 因为我觉得我们即使在天上飞翔，被命运的大风吹着，有些迷惘，有些无奈，但毕竟不是完全的无望。 我是那只蝴蝶，不是塑料袋。 http://www.tlkg.com.cn/maiba/share.action2?code=TVY7NTcwMDQ0 蝴蝶 原唱：侃侃 翻唱：叶子 无边的狂想 是我硕大的翅膀 带着我飞向远方 瘦弱的臂膀 空空的行囊 满载着我的梦想 流浪，流浪 迷失方向 远离我的故乡 飞翔，飞翔 越过迷惘 飞向金色天堂 …… 狭窄的橱窗 难以越过的围墙 隐示我划入沼塘 陌生的倔强 志念的无常 围割着稚嫩的冥想 遗忘，遗忘 城市的虚惶 远离孤深奢望 绽放，绽放 生命的异狂 飞向金色天堂 －－－－－－－－－－－－分割线－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－ 读书笔记 读《文心雕龙》写了四篇笔记，遇到 正纬第四，本来想硬硬头皮继续读下去的，可是一转念，现在读书，是为了自己高兴，既然没了兴致，那就放下呗～～辨骚第五，以后有了兴致再继续好了。 最后的一段感悟链接在这里： 有时间不如再和迷人的庄子一起跳跳舞吧
个人分类: 叶子杂记|55 次阅读|15 个评论
分享 今日读书笔记摘抄
热度 17 到处停留的叶子 2013-4-11 10:51
最近在零零碎碎读《文心雕龙》，已经在语文书斋煞有介事写了三个读书笔记了，有点像是一个人的散步，颇有平心静气的功效。偶有清风陪伴，更添雅意。 今天读到这段话，用爱坛的习惯，忍不住要献花。突然不想一个人独享，所以到日志里来记录一下。 体有六义；一则情深而不诡，二则风清而不杂，三则事信而不诞，四则义直而不回，五则体约而不芜，六则文丽而不淫。 情深而不诡，是诚 风清而不杂，是纯 事信而不诞，是真 义直而不回，是正 体约而不芜，是简 文丽而不淫，是美 真诚纯正，简约惟美，文章要达到这个境界才是好的。 算是今天散步的领悟吧。 ---------------------------------------书斋笔记链接----------------------------------- 再读《文心雕龙》
个人分类: 读书笔记|79 次阅读|6 个评论
分享 （读书笔记） 《旧制度与大革命》
水翦双眸 2012-12-24 13:13
一、版本信息 【法】托克维尔 著 冯棠 译 桂裕芳 张芝联 校 《旧制度与大革命》 商务印书馆 1997 年 北京 二、作者简介 法国历史学家 亚力克西 德 托克维尔（ Alexis de Tocque-ville ， 1805-1859 ） 成名作《论美国的民主》第一卷于 1835 年问世， 1840 年第二卷出版， 1841 年荣膺法兰西学院院士。 托克维尔出身贵族，政治上倾向于自由主义。 曾拒绝继承贵族头衔，他目睹了七月革命推翻波旁王朝，二月革命又推翻七月王朝； 1839 年起任众议院议员，二月革命后参与第二共和国宪法的制定，并一度在秩序党内阁中任 外交部长（ 1849 年 6-10 月） 1851 年路易波拿巴 在 12 月的政变和第二帝国专制政府的建立 令他悲观失望，迫使他成为“国内流亡者” 《旧制度与大革命》就是这个时候成书的。 三、目录 导言　《旧制度与大革命》影响史资料 　　前言 　　第一编 　　第一章　大革命爆发之际，人们对它的评论歧异 　　第二章　大革命的根本与最终目的并非像人们过去认为的那样，是要摧毁宗教权力 　　和削弱政治权力 　　第三章　大革命如何是一场以宗教革命形式展开的政治革命，其原因何在 　　第四章　何以几乎全欧洲都有完全相同的制度，它们如何到处陷于崩溃 　　第五章　法国革命特有的功绩是什么 　　第二编 　　第一章　为什么封建权利在法国比在其他任何国家更使人民憎恶 　　第二章　中央集权制是旧制度的一种体制而不是像人们所说是大革命和帝国的业绩 　　第三章　今天所谓的政府管理监督乃是旧制度的一种体制 　　第四章　行政法院与官员保证制是旧制度的体制 　　第五章　中央集权制怎样进入旧政治权力并取而代之，而不予以摧毁 　　第六章　旧制度下的行政风尚 　　第七章　在欧洲各国中，法国如何成为这样的国家，其首都已取得压倒外省的重要 　　地位，并吸取全帝国的精华 　　第八章　在法国这个国家，人们变得彼此最为相似 　　第九章　这些如此相似的人如何比以往更加分割成一个个陌生的小团体，彼此漠不关心 　　第十章　政治自由的毁灭与各阶级的分离如何导致了几乎所有使旧制度灭亡的弊病 　　第十一章　旧制度下自由的种类及其对大革命的影响 　　第十二章　尽管文明取得各方面进步，何以 18 世纪法国农民的处境有时竟比 13 世纪还糟 　　第三编 　　第一章　到 18 世纪中叶，文人何以变为国家的首要政治家，其后果如何 　　第二章　非宗教倾向在 18 世纪的法国人身上如何成为普遍占上风的激情，对大革命的特 　　点有何影响 　　第三章　法国人何以先要改革，后要自由有一件事值得注意，那就是，在为大革命作准 　　备的所有思想感情中，严格意义上的公共自由的思想与爱好是最后一个出现， 　　也是第一个消失的。 　　第四章　路易十六统治时期是旧君主制最繁荣的时期，何以繁荣反而加速了大革命的到来 　　第五章　何以减轻人民负担反而激怒了人民 　　第六章　政府完成人民的革命教育的几种做法 　　第七章　何以一次巨大的行政革命成为政治革命的先导，其结果如何 　　第八章　大革命如何从已往事物中自动产生 　　注释 　　附录一　论三级会议各省，尤其朗格多克 　　附录二　 1789 年前后法国社会政治状况 译名对照表 前言，从两封信说开来去 精彩段落 “立言比立功更好” 第一封、 To ：居斯塔夫 德 博蒙 书中的主题及主题论述方式 ： 他对我来说必须是当代的，并能为我提供一种手段，把事实与思想、历史哲学与历史本身结合。 事实的叙述 不再是本书的目的，所以不必去写帝国的历史来说明和使人明白构成这个时代链条的主要缓解的重大事件的原因、特点、意义。 事实的叙述 变成了作者头脑中的 全部思想 所依据的牢固而连续的基础。 这些思想 不仅涉及这个时期，而且涉及此前和此后的时期，涉及这些时期的特点，完成帝国的那位卓越人物，给法国大革命运动、国家命运及整个欧洲命运昭示的方向。 第二封、 To ：路易 德 凯尔戈尔 主题产生的基础 ： 一、 1、基于对自己能力的认知和自己的心灵的坚守和自我坚守 这十年给了我对人事的真知灼见和洞察精微的辨别能力，并未使我丢掉我的才智素有的透过众多现象观察人事的习惯， 我不能违背自己的精神与趣味向上爬的人，当我从自己的所作所为中得不到欢乐时我觉得我简直连个庸才都不如。 我这几年来经常寻求（无论如何还有一点安宁，是我可以观察一下四周，观察一下其他事物，跳出是我神仙其中的这一小团混乱） 我寻求我可以着手的那个主题，但是无所获，没有是我满心欢喜的心动主题，然而时光荏苒，人生苦短。。。。。于是作者更严肃深入的寻求一步书的主题思想， 2、基于公众感兴趣的和作者感兴趣的结合 只有我们的时代的事，当今世界呈现的景象伟大奇异，吸引了人们太多的注意力，使之无法付出许多代价来满足有闲而博学的社会对历史抱有的那些好奇心。 于作者天赋习惯结合就是对我们当代进行思考与观察汇总，对现代社会自由评判和对可能出现的未来的预见。 问题是问 二、 同类主题的焦点，主题产生的所有思想彼此相遇相连接的一点时，我却没有找到。我看到这样的一步著作的各个部分，却看不出它的整体，抓住了经纱，却抓不住纬纱，无法织成布。 所以托克维尔最终提出 这个主题 是需要 找到某个部分，为作者思想提供牢固而连续的事实基础。 ============================================================================================================ == 主题论述方式的最终确定 ： 以梯也尔先生的著作为蓝本，重写一下？作者对这种方式犹豫不定 。因为梯也尔著作重在 组织史实 作者倾向去 评价史实。 以作者的方式论述主题的困难在于， 历史本身和历史哲学结合 。 孟德斯鸠的著作 在一个更广的范围上论述使得叙述历史充分又不 赘述过头，其观点也始终清晰可见， 作者想，在一个更小的范围内 即 大革命时期来， 透过大量细致精确的事件探索路径。
个人分类: 读书笔记|2093 次阅读|0 个评论
分享 【读书笔记】蛤蟆的油 作者： [日] 黑泽明
热度 1 罗阿宝 2012-7-2 20:24
一、 读正宗日本人写的东西需要耐心，很有耐心，耐心的 N 次方 ...... 二、 实在耐不下去时，就 YY 一下历史学家在 “笔也写秃了”的故纸堆中排查美好事物的样子，例如： " 淡紫色的底衣上，加搭纯白外袍。小鸭子。刨冰放进甘葛，盛在新的金椀里。水晶的数珠。藤花。梅花上落雪积满了。非常美丽的小儿在吃着覆盆子。 " －《枕草子》 三、 终于看到想核实的东西，激动啊： 1、 编剧－空间，张与弛： 山本先生是编剧出身，他的编剧手法的确是出色的。 吉原作改编的《水野十郎左卫门》。其中有一场戏是， 水野向白鞘组的伙伴们讲江户城门旁边公告牌上的法令。我按照原作把这部分，写成水野先读了那公告牌上的法令，然后对他的伙伴们 说了 这件事。 山本先生看了剧本之后说，小说是可以这样描写的，但是电影剧本这样就不行了，这样太不打动人。说完立刻动笔修改给我看。 我读了改过的部分大吃一惊。山本先生不要水野看了公告牌上的法令之后再向伙伴说明的这种很慢的表现方法，而是改为水野拔下那公告牌扛回来，朝他伙伴面前 一扔，大声说：看这个 ! 【注：场景，冲击力】 从这以后，我改变了读文学作品的方法。也就是说，我找到了代替以往读文学作品的方法。具体地说就是：认真地思索 作者想说什么，他是怎样说的 。同时把我感受最深的地方，认为至关重要的情节写在身旁的笔记本上。这样，边读边记。 我把过去读过的作品按这种方法重读一遍时才深深感到，过去不过是形式上读了而已。 眺望高山的人，自己越是上到高的地方就越能看清山的高度。 2、 剪辑－时间，旋律与节奏： 关于剪辑，我从山本先生那里学到的东西难以数计，其中最重要的一项是：剪辑的时候必须具备纯粹客观地看待自已作品的能力。 山本先生剪自己辛辛苦苦拍下来的胶片时，简直象—个肆虐狂。山本先生要给观众看的，是没有多余部分而全篇充实的作品。 当然，拍片的时候是认为有其必要才拍的，但拍出来一看也会发觉根本不必拍的例子很多。不该要的就是不必拍 ! 但是，人往往习惯于和辛苦成正比地判断价值。这在电影剪辑上是最要不得的。 人们说电影是时间的艺术，所以，没有用的时间毫无用处。 在剪辑这方面，从山本先生学到的东西之中，这是最大的收获。 《马》 的故事中有母马到处找它那已被主人卖掉的马驹。这时，那母马象发了疯一般，把马厩撞开冲了出去，直奔放牧场而去，它甚至想从围栏钻进放牧场里。我哀怜这母 马，详细地拍了它的表情和行动，而且作了很有戏剧性的剪辑。但是一经放映却毫无这种感觉，不论怎样剪辑，画面上就是表现不出那母马念仔的心情。山本先生和 我一起看了好几遍我剪辑的影片，他只是默不作声。我知道，他不说 " 这行 " ，实际上就是 " 这不行 " 。我十分为难，就问山本先生该怎么好。我这一问，山本先生 回答说： " 黑泽君， 这里不是戏。可能是哀愁之情思吧。 " " 哀愁之情思 " ，这古代的日本语言，它立刻使我大有所悟。 " 我懂了 !" 我把剪辑方针完全改了。只把那些远景镜头接在一起。我只用剪影般的形象表现月明之夜的母马。她飘鬃扬尾漫无目的地奔跑不已。我觉得，只用这部分画面就足够了。它即使无声，但也使人仿佛听到它那一声声的哀嘶。同时再配以木管沉痛的哀调，更加使人理解母马的哀怨之情。 3、 演员，提线木偶 or 与人为本： 山本先生曾这样说： " 导演硬要演员按导演的想法表演，那么演员只能达到导演要求的—半。既然如此，倒不如推着演员按他自己的设想表演。那就会使演员得到双倍的成功。 " 所以，在山本先生的作品中扮演角色的演员，能得到自由发挥，表演轻松自然。最好的例子就是榎本健一 ( 演员 ) 。榎本在山本先生的作品中非常活泼，充分发挥了他的才能。 山本先生对待演员也非常亲切。我常常把临时演员 ( 比如扮演过路行人的、大场面中的群众，等等 ) 的名字忘掉，所以只好按他们的衣服颜色招呼他们。 " 喂，那个穿红的姑娘过来一下 !" 再不然就是： " 喂，那个穿蓝西服的 !" 结果被山本先生训了几句： " 黑泽君，那可不行。人都有个名嘛 ! " 这个我自然知道。可是我太忙，哪里有工夫查名字呢。但是，山本先生如果想对某演员提出表演上的要求时，即使那人是临时演员，他也这样说； " 黑泽君，请把那人的名字查一查告诉我好不好 ?" 等我查来报告他之后，他才向那演员提出演技上的要求： " 某某先生，请往左靠两三步。 " 名不见经传的演员听到山本先生如此亲切地招呼他，无不感动。难道能说山本先生有些滑头么 ? 我看应该说他善于用人。 除此之外关于演员的关键问题，我从山本先生那里学到了以下三点： 人不太了解自己，不能客观地观察自己的说话方式和自己的举止， 凡是有意识的动作，首先注意的不是动作本身，而是他的意识。 教给他怎么做才好，同时必须告诉他为什么这么做，并且让他充分理解，心悦诚服。 4、 配乐－电影是影像和声音的乘法： 山本先生对于电影的声音，也是十分慎重处理的。不论是自然声或者音乐，他无不以其纤细的感觉处理它。 所以，他对后期配音 ( 影片最后一项作业，加上音响或音乐，最后完成的工作 ) 的要求非常严格。电影是影像和声音的乘法，我这一贯主张，是通过山本先生后期配音工作而产生的， 详见《流动的光影声色：罗展凤映画音乐随笔 》 再谈黑泽明：映画音乐对位法 http ： //book.qq.com/s/book/0/11/11858/50.shtml 5、 表达技巧 －静水深流，才有张力： 成 濑先生喜欢拍许多短镜头。然后把它联结起来。看联结起来的短镜头时，谁也看不出那是短的，而是一个长镜头。十分流畅，你就不知道哪里是联结之处。而且，乍 看起来这些联结在一起的、很不引人注目、极其平凡的短镜头，实际上却象深邃的大河一样，它的表面虽然平静，然而深处却蕴藏着激流，奔涌向前，一泻千里。能 力之高超，那是无与伦比的。 6、 妥协： 森田—开头是这么说的： " 黑泽君说绝对不能剪。这家伙是有悖于情理的事绝对不干，请多多关照吧。 " 他说完就扭过身去，一声不吭地喝起马渊夫人给端来的酒。我和马渊上校彼此都把各自要说的话说完了，只好沉默不语，只是喝酒。 马渊夫人不停地端来烫好的酒，每次都是放心不下似地看看我们三个人之后退出去。 这种状态持续了多长时间，我无从计算，总之，马渊上校是个酒豪，他家的酒壶全部拿出来了，而且他夫人端来烫好的酒，随手取回空壶，这样往返多次，可见过了相当长的时间，经过了长时间的沉默，马渊上校突然把自己面前的小桌挪到旁边，两手拄着席铺对我深深一礼： " 对不起，剪掉吧 !" 到了这个地步，我也就理解对方的心情了。 我只好说； " 好，剪吧 !" 7、 认真 ： 光明寺的外景拍完那天，我到和尚那里去辞行，当时，和尚不胜感慨地对我说： " 老实说，开头我认为，你们砍寺院的树就等于砍我们的面子，所以我大为吃惊。不过没过多久，我被你们这种认认真真的工作精神吸引住了。看到了你们把尽可能让观众看到好作品作为牢固的信念，忘我地工作。我以前不知道，电影是这样努力的结晶啊，使我深为感动。 " 和尚说完将一把折扇放在我的面前。这是给我留作纪念的。那折扇上写着： " 益众生 " 三个字。 8、 【后记】 日 本民间流传着这样一个故事：在深山里，有一种特别的蛤蟆，它和同类相比，不仅外表更丑，而且还多长了几条腿。人们抓到它后，将其放在镜前或玻璃箱内，蛤蟆 一看到自己丑陋不堪的外表，不禁吓出一身油。这种油，也是民间用来治疗烧伤烫伤的珍贵药材。晚年回首往事，黑泽明自喻是只站在镜前的蛤蟆，发现自己从前的 种种不堪，吓出一身油——这油的结晶就是这部《蛤蟆的油》。 从孩提时代一个孱弱的“夜哭郎”，如何痴迷于绘画和电影，如何幸得启蒙而踏入电影界，最后如何执导《罗生门》等影片而成为世界级的导演黑泽明坦然直面过往的一切，人生的甘苦，艺术的感悟，流露于字里行间。 9、 【作者简介】 黑泽明，日本著名电影导演。 1910 年生于东京一个武士家庭，自小就在严格的家教下学习剑道、书法。 1943 年因执导第一部电影《姿三四郎》一举成名。 1950 年执导的电影《罗生门》，获威尼斯电影节金狮奖和奥斯卡最佳外语片奖，从而一跃成为世界级大导演。 1954 年执导了日本电影史上最著名的电影——《七武士》。执导的其他影片《生之欲》、《白痴》、《蜘蛛巢城》、《影子武士》、 《乱》、《梦》等，均已成为世界电影史上不朽的经典。 1990 年获奥斯卡终身成就奖。 1998 年病逝。 ________________________________________ 四、 【对比】【张艺谋电影的创作艺术】 来源： http ： //www.baywatch.cn 注：下面是我删减后的版本 本文就张艺谋电影创作的两种修辞艺术———象征和夸张作一些分析。 1 、象征 黑格尔在陈述象征手法时， 指出有三方面的理由： “ 第一个理由是强化效果； 第二是为了把自己和自己的情绪转化为美的形象 ； 第三， 隐喻的表达方式也可以起于想象力的恣肆奔放， 不愿按惯常形状去描绘事物或不用形象而只简单地直陈其意， 于是到处搜寻一种相关联的可供观照的具体形象。 因此 ， 隐喻也可以起于任意配搭的巧智，为着避免平凡，尽量在貌似不伦不类的事物中找出相关联的特征， 从而把相隔最远的东西出人意料地结合在一起 ”。 电影作为涵盖面极广的大众化视听艺术，所产生的造型感染力与冲击力远比静态的绘画或文字强烈而直接。张艺谋擅长的正是充分运用影象传播信息的特殊性，奇特巧妙地创造许多“象”外之“意”，“意”外之“境”，籍此给观众以双重或多重审美体验。 他对乡村传统题材的把握，每每具有双重象征意义，即一方面是对苍凉、残酷、贫穷的反思批判，另一方面又是对原始生命力的探寻与赞颂，表现城市生活亦不免流露出现代人对以往历史的几许依恋； 而他运用最多、最娴熟的艺术手段，便是象征。 局 部的、片断的象征手法，在中国电影里不胜枚举。然而，全局性的、风格化的象征性叙事，却不多见。《黄土地》是一部由张艺谋担任摄影的，一次具有开拓意义的 尝试。片中象征手法的运用在满足历史文化反思、拓展主题的深广度、描写群体命运方面是有特殊的功能的。陈凯歌在回顾《黄土地》创作时就曾说道： “采用的是一种象征手法。艺术表现上的这一特点，是由作品内容所决定的。影片的主旨，不是一般性地讲述个有头有尾的故事，而是想在更深的层次上，对我们的 民族性进行探索。要完成这一命题，一般意义上的纯写实手段，已经显得不够用了。 因为，仅仅把外部世界描绘得惟妙惟肖，还不能对生活做出本质的概括； 只有经过艺术家提炼加工所创造的内部真实，才能表现更深广的思想内涵”。 《黄土地》通过象征手法，对迎亲、腰鼓、祈雨三大象征段落进行描写，对农民和民族的历史进行了深刻的反思。 在 这场戏里，影片制作者对高粱的造型形象处理有几点值得注意。首先，影片给我们看到的既不是红高粱，也不是绿高粱，而是在逆光之下拍摄得浓重的近乎失色的黑 高粱。其次，影片利用摄影机追随着人物在高粱地里快速地移动，造成高粱杆从镜头前闪过的强烈的动感，又利用狂风劲吹，使高粱剧烈地大幅度摆动，形成一种遒 劲激越的气势。经过这样的处理，充满银幕的枝叶茂密的青纱帐，就像那两位正值人生盛年的男女主人公，洋溢着生命的活力，劲舞的高粱是两位主人公灵魂的呐 喊，活力的薄发。随着高亢的唢呐的鸣奏，人们的心绪被推上了百感交集的峰顶。在这一组表现自然生长的高粱的艺术镜头中，显然含有丰富的象征意义，可供人们 读解。 《菊豆》中，那向观众摇过来的密密麻麻的四合院村镇，尤其是杨家四合院，显然象征着中国恋爱和婚姻伦理的封闭、陈旧和腐朽。封闭的染坊，宛如一个使一切生机被摧残的腐朽的文化染缸。从屋樑上喷泻而下的红布，在述说着个人的生命本能的强烈和对爱的不可遏制。 《大红灯笼高高挂》它有很强的造型、强烈的意念、生动的象征，还有对历史、文化的反思和批判。陈家四合院是由若干封闭的小四合院组成的四合院群落，每一小四合院似乎就代表一个被封杀的妾或女人的命运，它们合起来就仿佛组成了一个残杀自由生命的杀人不见血的血腥场所。 张艺谋解释说： “《大红灯笼高高挂》继承了原作的风格，也根本不是一个严格写实的作品。它从构思到整个影象都是意象的、象征的、符号性的。”确实，这部电影对象征的意念的追求达到了极致。 《秋菊打官司》里引人注目的一串串红辣椒，既是陕北乡土风情的写照，也象征了主人公秋菊性格的泼辣与固执。 《秋 菊打官司》每次出门告状，画外都有一声秦腔叫板“走哇———”，也显然不仅仅为了渲染气氛，而是一种意味深长的文化代码，在张艺谋眼中，即如《秋菊》那样 同步录音的记实电影，“在斜视的基础上也需要再创造，音乐、音响的再创作不是独立的，它要衬托、渲染，传达作品的立意”。 “言者所以明象，得象而忘言； 象者所以存意，得意而忘象。”电影的象征艺术有着独特奇妙的功能，张艺谋正是通过象征艺术，以富于含蕴的镜头表达出丰富而深刻的含义。 2 、夸张 在电影艺术中，夸张作为一种表现手段，指为了启发观众的想象力和加强影片的表现力，用夸大的语言、动作、场景、色彩等来塑造人物，深化主题思想，一切艺术 都离不开夸张，没有夸张，就成不了艺术。但夸张手法的运用，必须遵循一条重要的原则，夸张不失真。即使夸张到荒诞不经的地步，也不能失去艺术真实性。夸张必须是合理的荒诞，荒诞而不合理，失去真实性，那就不是成功的夸张。 《红 高粱》中，张艺谋传播是酒神文化和酒神精神。酒神精神是人的自我精神和情绪的曲折体现，是人的那种浓烈、奔放、旷达、洒脱、自由、狂热精神的外化与显现。 他要通过《红高梁》赞美生命，赞美生命的自由、舒畅，表现那种无拘无束的自由狂放。因而，张艺谋采用极度张扬的“红色”，浓烈豪放地礼赞了炎黄子孙追求自 由的顽强意志和生生不息的强大生命力。 《红高梁》的影片色调，主要运用了红、蓝两种鲜明有力的原色和一种柔和含蓄的黄色中间色。影片的主色调是红色。《红高梁》中极度张扬的红色世界，不完全是现实 时空中各种事象的原样再现，而是影片创造者主观情思的表现，是客观物象与红色的扩张力获得了一种凝固的近乎永恒的沉寂效果。黑红色的高梁舒展流动充满了整个银幕空间，极为辉煌、华丽、壮美，使影片礼赞生命的主题得到升华。 《秋 菊打官司》中，秋菊把讨“说法”当作真正的“活法”，因而由村而乡而县而市，展开自己的层层讨说法的历程。在影片中，秋菊是幸运的，处处遇到童话王国般的 好人； 但她又是不幸的，总是得不到区区“说法”。最后，当村长帮她难产脱险、顺利生产儿子时，她感到了这是父母官对自己的莫大恩德，于是放弃讨“说 法”，以免落如民间所谓“恩将仇报”的道德陷阱。张艺谋用这种大起大落的叙事手法，极度夸张的艺术方式，显露由主人公秋菊的性格从固执到震惊和茫然的变 化。 在 《我的父亲母亲》里，张艺谋为了实现自己对影片的深层次立意，又一次采用了极度夸张的艺术手法，造就了一组让观众震撼的、始终在运动的艺术画面。尤其是招 娣捧着装满蒸饺的蓝边瓷碗，在起伏的山路上狂奔，使这种夸张和渲染达到了极致。这些画面在一起是一种叠加，幻化出张艺谋独有的风格特征： 他以自然人的生命力为书写对象，以自由挥洒为态度，以走向极致为追求。张艺谋曾道出了自己一贯的创作准则： “逮着原作的基本精神往死里做。” 如果说成就大师的先决条件是绝对自由的创作心态，是对语言、形式及主题表达冲破一切束缚的改造的能力和勇气，那么，张艺谋的才华在这几点上是突出的。他使 “我母亲”———这个乡村女孩的神韵得到了极度的张扬。 歌德对爱克曼说过： “你就必须闯艺术的真正高大的难关了，就是个别事物的掌握。你必须费大力挣扎，使自己从观念中解脱出来。”又说，“我知道这个课题确实是难，但是艺术的真正生命正在于个别特殊事物的掌握和描述。” 张艺谋深谙艺术创作就是要塑造出人物个性各异的艺术典型，因此，他准确地运用夸张手法，突出了“我奶奶”的奔放，秋菊的执拗，魏敏芝的执著，“我母亲”的 痴情这些具有鲜活个性的人物形象，使张艺谋的电影画廊熠熠生辉。 张艺谋影片中的象征、夸张两大艺术特点，是导向他走向成功、创造电影神话的重要因素。 注：啰嗦的范文 ________________________________________ 五、 【结论】要让人印象深刻，需触动人心，怎样触动人心不好简单回答，但引发观众情绪则比较简单， 例如： 1 、锣鼓朝天的夸张与热闹 ；－ 如果缺乏深度，只是简单脸谱化，容易让人厌倦；嫁娶订盟纳采祭祀祈福斋醮开光会亲友等等古礼中，象征、夸张两大艺术特点比艺谋同志的片子有深度，也耐看得多了。 2 、细致入微的观察，不厌其烦地把日常生活雕刻成个性化的东西 ；－ 太独特无广度，容易审美疲劳，如清少纳言，当然《枕草子》已比现在书店中 90 ％的畅销书强。 3 、让人先静下心来，有张有弛，细致耐心地展现最真的人性与生活，基石是作者生活阅历的思考与沉淀； －容易让人忽略，这个时代，大师或无心名利的人可以这样做，小盆友就等着喝西北风吧。 忽而想起以前在西河的看贴心得： 作者心境平和，才能在作品中投影出那么多栩栩如生的故事与人物，读着读着，让我们自己的心态也沉静安稳下来，更加能感受到字里行间的真实与掩藏的情绪。 文字 ( 艺术 ) 的魅力来自于作者本身而非技巧。
个人分类: 小白学心理|6 次阅读|0 个评论
分享 读书笔记之二号首长和侯卫东官场笔记
热度 13 就爱抬杠 2012-4-24 21:28
这两部小说可能是最近最热的官场小说了。二号首长前两天这里就有人推荐过，侯卫东官场笔记则号称被柳传志认为是写尽中国官场的小说。 二号首长里的“二号首长”指的是领导秘书，主人公唐小舟由于偶然的机遇，直接从记者当上了省委书记的秘书，成为二号首长。网上有传言，省委书记赵德良影射的是湖南省委书记周强，书中的一些事情也确有湖南当地情况的影子。 侯卫东则是从基层干起，毕业后被分到乡镇，进而被排挤到山上，等于下放。由于偶然的机遇，带头修路，从此发家，既挣了钱，又步步高升，截止目前的进度，已经当了地级市的市长。 以前说金庸小说是成人童话，其实更适合十几岁的学生。连邓小平都抱着金庸不放的情况只能说文革把大家憋得太久了。现代官场小说才是真正的成人童话。主角都要出身贫寒，地位低微，由于偶然的机遇，一路高升，中间当然有不少坎坷。看看，这和金庸小说不是一个套路吗？ 然而金庸小说里的江湖毕竟离大家太远，官场小说里的情况却往往仿佛就在身边。在现实生活中无能为力，一筹莫展的小人物，看看官场小说也能过一把当官的瘾，这总比梦想去当个大侠现实得多，何况现在再厉害的大侠也比不过一把手枪。 官场小说的现实性还在于告诉你社会其实不是那么黑白分明，好人也会做坏事，坏人也会做好事。每当看到这些就会想起当年的胡雪岩，高阳把胡雪岩写的花团锦簇，似乎对所有人都好。问题是，他损害了谁的利益？小说中是没有明说的。 侯卫东在当上市开发区主任时有过类似的感慨，他老婆的一个同事，从来不打交道，也上门送礼，求帮把自己儿子安排到交通局当司机。侯卫东想，对他来说这只是一句话的事，对那人来说可能就是天大的事。问题是，他安排了这人，可能就有更符合条件，更应该在这个位置上的人被排挤出去了。当领导秘书更容易升官又何尝不是如此？但社会就是这样，你不照顾自己的人，不带自己的队伍，就会有别人来做这些事，你可能就上不去。 二号首长里讲党委和政府之间互相制约又互相支持的关系，以及对当前体制下的分权制衡关系的评论有点意思。如果把这些进一步制度化，其实未必不是中国特色政治体制改革的一条出路，至少作为过渡是完全没有问题的。
个人分类: 读书笔记|4331 次阅读|7 个评论
分享 读书笔记之外交十记
热度 12 就爱抬杠 2012-4-19 08:58
外交十记是前外长钱其琛的回忆录，讲了自己外交生涯中的十个主题。 说起钱其琛，和他同期的台湾外长有一段是钱复，因此被人戏称为，钱外长，钱副外长。 文字很平实，几乎不带感情色彩。外交工作，本来就是如此。总理讲外交无小事。做具体工作的人，甚至到外长这一级，只是执行国家政策而已，本身并无多大活动空间。 向金日成通报和韩国建交的决定是他去的。金日成不在平壤，去了后又换乘直升机到湖边别墅。钱说，在他的记忆中，这是金日成会见中国官员时间最短的一次，也是唯一的一次没有安排宴请。 一切尽在不言中。 都说建国后中国支援朝鲜多少多少，再加上抗美援朝等等。但在东北，林彪同样得到朝鲜大量支援，这个我们也没说。 89年的大事件，对中国影响很大。但根据钱的回忆，其实接下来的苏东巨变影响更大。本来双方有默契美国在90年就邀请江泽民访美恢复关系的，包括英国在香港政改方面的出尔反尔，这些变化都是在东欧变化后才产生的。 形势比人强。所以无论当时还是现在，想起当年鲁平说彭定康“千古罪人”，无疑是太意气用事了。各为其主，都想给自己国家争取更多利益罢了。你有了空子，人家不用是情分，人家用了是本分。 最带感情色彩的评述可能是对美国国务卿贝克，说他喜欢做交易，而且往往就是用这样的语言来说。本来外交做交易理所当然，但太当生意做，也未免为正统外交官不齿。本来贝克和钱做的交易是中国对攻打伊拉克不投反对票，贝克就可以邀请钱访美并会见布什总统。后来看中国确实无意否决，贝克也有些后悔，觉得出价高了。希望中国投赞成票，钱没同意，并拿出当时电话记录说当时说的就是不否决就行。贝克无言以对，但后来说访美可以，总统有安排见不了了。钱不理他，直接要驻美大使和总统国家安全事务助理斯考克罗夫特联系，还是见到了布什总统。 为什么有这条线呢？因为其实布什在89年0月就已经秘密派遣斯考克罗夫特访华，贝克还坚持派了个副国务卿随行，有点像当年基辛格访华。但其实保密措施更严。 斯考克罗夫特后来在回忆录里说，因为太保密了，所以从上海入境时空军认为这是一架不明国籍的飞机，请示要不要打下来。请示到了杨尚昆那里，被否决了。 看上去很惊险是哦，钱说根本没有这回事。按不明国籍飞机入境是真的，但从头至尾都安排好了，哪里可能那么惊险。 这就像沈志华讲的，档案，文献和口述实录的可信性问题。
个人分类: 读书笔记|706 次阅读|1 个评论
分享 读书笔记之亭长小武
热度 2 就爱抬杠 2012-4-17 11:47
06年的书了，前些日子去逛批发市场买的。 早就听说过，但不知什么内容，单看名字还以为讲刘邦怎么发迹的。其实是说汉武帝时的亭长小武由于熟悉律令，机缘巧合，一步步升到京兆尹，封侯，娶了诸侯王的翁主，最后被卷入太子谋反案自杀的故事。 作者史杰鹏，北师大教授，原来在天涯上的名字是梁惠王。 作者很熟悉历史，小武是靠对律令的熟悉以及关键时刻的机敏果断一步步升迁的，每一个紧要关头，都有相关的转折点，都要靠对历史和当时律令乃至案例的熟悉来支撑。 看完以后，对汉朝法律的完善感到很吃惊，其实当时的律令已经规定的很细了，而且合情合理，只不过最后的决断还是要皇上来下决心。皇上也会顾忌传统，尊重律令，但也可以自行决断。 法律的实施，依靠普及，依靠对权力的敬仰。书中小武把相关律令案例一说，大家即无言以对。其实在写字还用竹简的西汉，能有那么多人对律令那么熟悉？这当然属于挑刺了。 即使律令就是这么定了，还有一个最后的仲裁者就是皇上。建国后，领导人说，我们是和尚打伞，无法无天；又说，我们不靠法律，主要靠开会定政策，发文件。 权力是属于法，还是属于人，是人治还是法治？
654 次阅读|1 个评论
分享 美国种族简史 读书笔记7：犹太人在美国
到处停留的叶子 2012-3-23 07:20
当时不写德国人的那部分笔记，主要是急着要看后面这一章：犹太人。
个人分类: 读书笔记|0 个评论
分享 美国种族简史 读书笔记6： 德国移民的历史（完）
热度 18 到处停留的叶子 2012-3-23 04:34
我这个人比较偷懒，书已经看到第六部分概论了，读书笔记却停了很久。 可惜有些感想已经消失。好处是可以沉淀一下再写。 上次德国移民的笔记，写到美国独立战争期间，还记得一点很有意思：那时候英国买了很多德国雇佣兵，搬到殖民地来镇压美国人造反。这些雇佣兵半数以上来自黑森卡瑟尔，因此这些雇佣兵被美国人称为“黑森人”。结果大约有一半的黑森人打完仗就留在美国不走了，在德意志移民社区安家立业了。 然后是19世纪的德国移民， 比起18世纪的移民来说，19世纪德裔移民更多来自城市，他们从德国带来许多的技术本领，包括各行各业，木匠、面包师、铁匠、屠夫、鞋匠、裁缝等等。19世纪中叶的美国东部城市，半数以上受雇的德裔是技术劳动工人。19世纪中叶以后，除了香肠和啤酒以外，一些更高层次的德国技术被德国人在美国发扬光大，其中包括光学镜片的制造（眼镜、照相机、显微镜、望远镜），工程建筑的技术（包括布鲁克林大桥在内的缆索大桥），还有钢琴的制作。 19世纪是德国人在美国遍地开花的年代，几乎所有我在德国人开篇所感叹过的都是在这个时期被发扬光大的，包括周末的娱乐方式，学校教育的方式等等，但德裔美国人他们不是很擅长政治，不像在工业、科学和音乐方面人才辈出。倒是有个德裔政治漫画大师在19世纪颇有名气，形象地以驴子和大象来代表两个党就首次出于他的笔下。 跨进20世纪初期的德裔美国人处境非常令人羡慕，他们过着欣欣向荣的生活，在一定程度上已经被社会广泛的接受和尊重。他们的文化和美国文化很好的融合在一起，他们自己也已经美国化了。 “牛肉香肠，德式巧克力饼，啤酒，幼儿园，体育馆和大学，现在已经成了美国国计民生的一部分，美国学校里也广泛地教授德语。然后当第一次世界大战开始时，席卷全美的反德情绪就粗暴的使这些良好的发展趋势发生了变化。” 这时候颇有一些美籍德国人同情故国，因此连当时的总统威尔逊都说了，那些带破折号的美国人很有可能身在曹营心在汉。这个破折号的说法影响到美国的许许多多种族群体，让他们后来一直耿耿于怀。 但是事实证明美籍德国人并不像人们想得那样，千千万万的德裔子弟参加了美军和德国作战，包括著名的潘兴将军（General John J. Pershing）就是一位德裔。 事实上，二十世纪的德国血统美国人，他们在政治方面崭露头角到显赫的地位颇有几位，人数是不多，其身份也不代表种族。其中包括第一位具有德国血统的总统先生赫伯特.胡佛，还有我们更为熟悉的艾森豪威尔。 随着希特勒和纳粹在德国的兴起，1930年代的德国人移民又到了一个高潮，这次带来的是某些世界上数一数二的学者，科学家，艺术家和文人，他们多是犹太人。本书作者说，在人类历史上，知识天才从一个国家转移到另外一个国家，这可能是规模最大的一次。爱因斯坦一个人的转移，就有重大的历史意义，因为这使得美国成为世界上获得核能的第一个国家。 二战的时候美国本土并没有多少德裔人同情故国了，此次指挥美军在欧洲登陆以帮助打败德国的，就是艾森豪威尔将军，宾夕法尼亚德国人的后裔。 今天（写书的年代是70年代）的美籍德国人，在经历了很多代的同化之后，仍然向人口统计局认定自己属于德意志民族的人，究竟是否具有德国先民的特征，已经很难说了，无论如何，自认为自己是德裔的美国公民，在1972年大致占美国总人口的13%。
个人分类: 读书笔记|29 次阅读|0 个评论
分享 读书笔记测试
landy 2012-3-4 03:57
---------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------- 那么，问题来了，这样一种空头类型的ETF，到底适不适合持有以达到对冲市场风险的目的呢？ 　　 　　答案并非是肯定的，对于组合基金来说，答案甚至是否定的。 　　 　　在ETF界占有先驱地位的爱世公司旗下，有这么一只跟踪指数股，在纽交所的代号是FXI，它追踪的是25只大型中国公司的股票综合表现。作为它的反向指数股，由普适公司发行的代号为FXP的ETF，采用了双倍杠杆率操作空头，被很多做空中国股市的散户所津津乐道。可是实际在金融风暴最集中的两个月时间里，它的表现却非常有趣。在08年9月5日，FXI股价收于39.17，FXP收于96；在11月5日，FXI收在24.65，从而两个月里的回报率是（24.65-39.17）=-37%，印证了同期中国股市的大跌。按说，以双倍杠杆做空的FXP，理论的回报率应该是37%的双倍，也就是74%，对应的股价应该飙升至96×1.74=167才合适。实际是多少呢？11月5日FXP收在87，总回报率是负的9.3%！到底出了什么问题？ 　　我曾经去察看过被归于熊市基金一类的某只共同基金的持股，发现为了达到与大市相反走向的目标，这只共同基金里持有了大量的黄金和有色金属的开发矿业公司的股票，排在持股比例的前几名。分析这里面的逻辑，这一类贵重金属，在股市牛市的时期，表现都与市场背道而驰，因为投资者都被短期的利益所驱使，把资金投在了炒作效应浓厚的小型股上面，没有人会投资黄金白银这些最保守，比传统行业大型股还要稳健的板块，从而造成了从事采掘开发的公司股票表现低于大市的情形；但是在漫漫熊市，情势正好反过来，保守成了终极目标，所谓盛世买古董，乱世买黄金，这类公司也就成了香饽饽，表现会优于大市。可见，在共同基金里面，由于不得做空的规定，要想达到实际表现和大市反向的效果，就只有去增持这一类公司，实际上是寻求一种近似的负相关。而在当前流行的反向杠杆空头ETF之中，实现做空的手段，是直接买入大量的与指数挂钩的回报互换交易仓位（total return swap），并不是简单的卖空指数所包含的成份股，理论上这一类交易的回报可以做到和实际对应的行业地区市场指数非常高度的负相关。 　　 　　爱世公司旗下出品了大量的跟踪指数股，他们的策略无一例外的是买进指数包含的成份股，所以能够完全体现指数的涨跌。普适公司旗下大量的双倍杠杆空头ETF是以回报互换交易为主，而不是卖空指数成份股，这样的做法能够最大限度的体现与指数的负相关性，但是限制之一也表达的很清楚，就是这类空头ETF股，只能够忠实的对应体现指数每天的涨跌百分比，在一定时期过后，如果指数经受了上下剧烈的波动，那么由于复利的原因，这一天天的叠加效果，在终期体现的实际总回报率，往往不但不能达到指数同期的反值，反而会劣于这个期望值。上面FXI和FXP的对比就是一个极好的例子。 　　 　　为了说明这样叠加起来复利的差异，再举一个极端一些的例子，假设某个指数第一天本身跌20%，那么做空的反向双倍ETF理应有当天20%的双倍增值，即由初始值100变为140；第二天，这个指数又涨回25%，从而两天下来指数不涨不跌，持平（1x(1-20%)x(1+25%)=1），那么在第二天，这个反向双倍ETF应该跌去当天指数涨幅25%的双倍，即由当天初值140跌去50%，只剩下70。两天下来，指数没变，这个反指ETF已经惨遭七折优惠。这里面的关键就在于这类ETF体现的是当天的指数回报率，从而我们可以引申出的一个简单结论就是，这类杠杆率操作的空头ETF，实在是不适合长期持有。尤其在市场波动性大大异于平时平均水平的大熊市，貌似持有这类ETF可以从中获得丰厚利润，实际上如果对于操作进入点和离开点的稍微不慎，就可能导致巨量损失。对比之下，买入长期的认沽期指合约，大概是稳妥得多的对冲市场风险方式 Contents Generals Strategy Glossary Generals · It seems easy to foresee which industry will grow the fastest, that foresight has no real value if most other investors are already expecting the same thing. By the time everyone decides that a given industry is obviously the best one to invest in, the prices of its socks have been bid up so high that its future returns have nowhere to go but down. (p16) · Stocks become more risky, not less, as their prices rise-and less risky, not more, as their prices fall.(p17) · The defensive investor must confine himself to the shares of important companies with a long record of profitable operations and in strong financial condition.(p29) · Definition of investing (p35) · You invest only if you would be comfortable owning a stock even if you had no way of knowing its daily share price (p36). · Never mingle the money in your speculative account with what’s in your investment accounts; never put more than 10% of your assets into your mad money account (p46). · There is no close time connection between inflationary/deflationary conditions and the movement of common-stock earnings and prices (p51). Reasons for why rising prices do not have effect on the earning power (p53): (1) rise in wage rates. (2) The need for huge amounts of new capital, thus holding down the ratio of sales to capital employed. · Stocks failed to keep up with inflation about one-fifth of the time (p61). · It is wrong that those who cannot afford to take risks should be content with a relatively low return on their invested funds (p88). · Straight-Nonconvertible-preferred stocks are not good for intelligent investor (p98). Preferred stock offers individuals no tax advantage (p99n). · A traditional rule of thumb was to subtract your age from 100 and invest that percentage of your assets in stocks, with the rest in bonds or cash. It is nonsense (p102). · The yield on stocks has (so far) continuously stayed below the yield on bonds. “High prices” of stocks affect their dividend yields (makes it low) (p113n). · An industrial company’s finances are not conservative unless the common stock (at book value) represents at least of half of the total capitalization, including all bank debt. For a railroad or public utility the figure should be at least 30% (p122). Book value liability. · “Buy what you know” (p127)? Familiar breeds complacency. It is always the neighbor/best friend/parents of the criminal who say “he was such a nice guy”. · U.S bankruptcy law entitles bondholders to a much stronger legal claim than shareholders … Thus the bonds of a troubled company can perform almost as well as the common stock of a healthy company (p156). · Characteristics for bull market (p193) 1. a historically high price level 2. high P/E value 3. low dividend yields as against bond yields 4. much speculation on margin 5. Many IPOs of poor quality. · Gain 50% and lose 33% standard (p196) · 35 years economy cycle of insanity, next is 2030 (p236n) · A large part of value found for a high P/E growth stock is derived from future projections which differ markedly from past performance (p282). The higher the growth rate you project, and the longer the future period over which you project it, the more sensitive your forecast becomes to the slightest error (p282n). If, for instance, EPS is $1, estimation of profit is 15% a year for the next 15 years. If the market values the company at 35 P/E, the price would be $285. if the growth rate is 14% and P/E is 20, the stock would end up around $140. · Chapter 11 and 12 are very important Strategy · Practices for the defensive investor (p29): Purchase of the shares of well-established investment funds. Common trust funds/commingled funds operated by trust companies and banks. Dollar-cost averaging. 25%~75% p22, p89, p91 ex. P104 details: rebalance every 6 months in your 401k. and the chief advantage of such a formula will give you something to do . · Argument of why the following ways are not good for defensive investor (p30): Trading in the market. Short-term selectivity Long-term selectivity · Four formula to fiasco (p41) Cash in on the calendar: January effect. The foolish four and stock name with no repeating letters (p45,p46) · Alternatives to common stocks as inflation hedges Gold: avoids investing in gold directly, seek out a well-diversified mutual fund specializing in the stocks of precious-metal companies and charging below 1% in annual expenses. Limit your stake to 2% of your total financial assets (p56n). · Two ways to defenses against inflation (p63) 1. REITs: Real Estate Investment Trusts. REITs as of Real Estate is much like Mutual Fund as of Stock. 2. TIPs · P/E ration below 10 is considered low, between 10 and 20 is considered moderate, and greater than 20 is considered expensive (p70n). Strategy for Defensive Investor · Defensive investor should buy only tax-free (municipal) bonds outside your retirement account (p106); Buy intermediate –term bonds maturing in 5 to 10 years; buying individual bonds makes no sense unless you have at least $100k to invest.(the only exception is bonds issued by the U.S. Treasure), for most investors, bond funds beat individual bonds hands down (the main exceptions are Treasury securities and some municipal bonds). Web links for online bond calculators, introduction to bond investing, and bond funds. · The Wide World of Bonds table (p108) provides analysis for all kind of bonds for defensive investor . · Mortgage securities / Annuities / Preferred stock (p110) MS bonds are not backed by the U.S. Treasure, so they sell at higher yields. Mortgage bonds generally under perform when interest rates fall and bomb when rates rise. Annuities are not attractive for investors under age 50. Preferred shares are a worst-of-both-worlds investment. · Rules for the common stock component for defensive investor (p114). 1. There should be adequate though not excessive diversifications. 10~30 Online broker and tax tracking tool (p128); web sites for buying individual stocks straight from the issuing company. They are cheaper. Web sites to help determine wheather the stocks you own are sufficiently diversified. 2. Each company selected should be large, prominent, and conservatively financed. Today Large means stock value (market capitalization) of at least $10billion. 3. Each company selected should have a long record of continuous dividend payments ( 10 years) 4. Purchase only with 7 years average P/E 25 and 12 months average P/E20. 5. Index funds are defensive investor’s dream come true (p130, 249). And the ideal way to dollar-cost average is into a portfolio of index funds for U.S. stock market, bonds, and foreign stocks. Some list in p369 6. I do not know and I do not know is the best response (p131) · Growth stocks as a whole as too uncertain and risky a vehicle of defensive investor (p116). · Good web links for “portfolio trackers” (p117n). Strategy for Enterprising Investor · The most useful generalizations for the enterprising investor are of a negative sort. Let him leave high-grade preferred stocks to corporate buyers. Let him also avoid inferior types of bonds and preferred stocks unless they can be bought at bargain levels-which means ordinarily at prices at least 30% under par for high-coupon issues, and much less for the lower coupons. He will let someone else buy foreign-government bond issues, even though the yield may be attractive. He will also be wary of all kinds of new issues , including convertible bonds and preferred that seem quite tempting and common stocks with excellent earnings confined to the recent past . For standard bond investments the aggressive investor would do well to follow the pattern suggested to his defensive confrere and make his choice between high-grade taxable issues and good –quality tax-free bonds (p134,p134n for updated yields) · Second-Grade Bonds and Preferred Stocks (p134) Corporations with relatively poor credits standing have found it virtually impossible to sell “strait bonds” — i.e., nonconvertibles—to the public. Hence their debt financing has been done by the sale of convertible bonds (or bonds with warrants attached). Virtually all the nonconvertible bonds of inferior rating represent older issues which are selling at a large discount. Convertible bonds can be converted into shares of stock in the issuing company, usually at some pre-announced ratio. High-yield bonds = second grade = lower grade bonds = junk bonds (p145) are too costly and cumbersome for an individual investor to diversify away the risks of default. · The main difference between first and second grade bonds is usually found in the number of times the interest charges have been covered by earnings (p135, p284). It is unwise to buy a bond or a preferred which lacks adequate safety merely because the yield is attractive. · New Issues Generally: These should be subjected to careful examination and unusually severe tests before they are purchased (p139). There are two reasons: 1. New IPO have special salesmanship behind them, which calls therefore for a special degree of sales resistance. New IPOs normally are sold with an “underwriting discount” (a built-in commission) of 7%. By contrast, the buyer’s commission on older shares of common stock typically ranges below 4%. Whenever Wall Street makes roughly twice as much for selling something new as it does for selling something old, the new will get the harder sell. 2. Most new issues are sold under “favorable market conditions” – which means favorable for the seller and consequently less favorable for the buyer. (Often when the stock market is near a peak). The over supply of IPOs helped create the bear market and the undersupply, in turn, helped feed the bull market. · New Common-Stock Offerings (p141). Common-stock financing takes two different forms. 1. Rights offerings (fen chai quan qian) have become rare in the U.S., except among closed-end funds. 2. Placement with the public of common stock of what were formerly privately owned enterprises. (Initial Public Offering).(original common-stock flotation). One fairly dependable sign of he approaching end of a bull swing is the fact that new common stocks of small and nondescript companies are offered at prices somewhat higher than the current level for many medium-sized companies with a long market history. In Graham’s day, the most prestigious investment banks generally steered clear of the IPO business, which was regarded as an undignified exploitation of naïve investor. · Dying a trader’s death (p149) The extra higher bid/ask cost is called “Market impact”. Buying or selling a hot little stock can cost 2% to 4%. When you trade instead of invest, you turn long-term gains into ordinary income (tax). Add it all up, and a stock trader needs to gain at least 10% just to break even. · Operations in Common Stocks for enterprising investor (p156): 1. Buying in low markets and selling in high markets. 2. Buying carefully chosen “ growth stocks” Can assemble outperformed the averages stocks list from morning star Stock Quickrank tool, www.quicken.com/investments/stocks/search/full , and http://yahoo.marketguide.com (p157n); To update fund performance by type, check “Category Returns in morning star (p159n). There are two concerns: the first is that common stocks with good records and apparently good prospects sell at correspondingly high prices. The second is that his judgment as to the future may prove wrong. Rapid growth cannot keep up forever (p158). Graham insists on calculating the P/E ration based on a multiyear average of past earnings (p159n). The striking thing about growth stocks as a class is their tendency toward wide swings in market price. Consider the 22% drop for Intel after a 5% growth quarterly report (p160n). The faster these companies grew, the more expensive their stocks became. And when stocks grow faster than companies, investors always end up sorry (p181). The bigger they get, the slower they grow. The market is unkindest to rapidly growing companies that suddenly report a fall in earnings. More moderate and stable growers as Anheuser-Busch and Colgate-Palmolive tend to suffer somewhat milder stock declines if they report disappointing earnings. Great expectations lead to great disappointment if they are not met. Thus, one of the biggest risks in owing growth stocks is not that their growth will stop, but merely that it will slow down. And in the long run, that is not merely a risk, but a virtual certainty (p321n). 3. Buying bargain issue of various types p196: From the “Money Investing” section in Wall Street Journal, find the lists of stocks that have hit new lows for the past year. Or Morningstar à Stocks à New Highs and Lows. You may find a stock with market capital less than net working capital (current asset – total liabilities) 4. Buying into “ special situation ” · The Recommended Fields for Enterprising Investor (p162). Policy required: (1) It must meet objective or rational tests of underlying soundness; (2) it must be different from the policy followed by most investors or speculators. 1. The Relative Unpopular Large Company (p163) The large companies have a double advantage over the others. First, they have the resources in capital and brain power to carry them through adversity and back to a satisfactory earnings base. Second, the market is likely to respond with reasonable speed to any improvement shown. “Dogs of the Dow”: the strategy of buying the cheapest stocks in DJIA (p164n). Each year buy 10 issues in the DJIA which were selling at the lowest P/E of their current or previous year’s earnings. Buy stock in a low P/E list by requiring also that the price be low in relation to past average earnings or by some similar test (p165 table). 2. Purchase of Bargain Issues: Bonds and preferred stocks selling well under par, as well as common stocks (p166). There are two test First is by the method of appraisal. This relies largely on estimating future earnings and then multiplying these by a factor. If the price is higher than market price, you can say it is a bargain. Second test is the value of the business to a private owner. Pay more attention on the realizable value of the assets, with particular emphasis on the net current assets or working capital. We should require an indication of at least reasonable stability of earnings over the past decade or more—i.e., no year of earrings deficit—plus sufficient size and financial strength to meet possible setbacks in the future (p168). The idea combination here is thus that of a large and prominent company selling both well below its past average price and its past average P/E ratio. The most identified bargain issue is a common stock that sells for less than the company’s net working capital alone (net working capital is current assets-total liabilities including preferred stock and long-term debt p169n). 3. Bargain-issue Pattern in Secondary Company (p172). A company is not a leader in a fairly important industry. Reasons to believe a secondary issue is undervalued: First, the dividend return is relatively high. Second, the reinvested earnings are substantial in relation to the price paid and will ultimately affect the price. Third, a bull market is ordinarily most generous to low-priced issues. Forth, even during relatively featureless market periods a continuous process of price adjustment goes on, under which secondary issues that were undervalued may rise at least to the normal level for their type of security. Fifth, the specific factors that made for a disappointing record of earnings may be corrected by the advent of new conditions, or the adoption of new policies, or by a change in management. 4. Special Situations, or “Workouts” (p174) à Arbitrages and workouts such as acquisitions of smaller firms by large ones. This is not applicable for normal investor. à Breakup of public utility companies. à Lawsuit. 5. final conclusion: do not buy at “full prices” of (1) foreign bonds, (2)ordinary preferred stocks, and (3) secondary common stocks. Enterprising investor only buy them when prices not more than 2/3 of the appraisal value of the securities. · How to handle Market Fluctuations Ø There are two possible ways of profiting: timing and pricing. By timing we mean the endeavor to anticipate the action of the stock market — to buy or hold when the future course is deemed to be upward, to sell or refrain from buying when the course is downward (X). By pricing we mean the endeavor to buy stocks when they are quoted below their fair value and to sell them when they rise above such value (p191). Ø Why Dow Theory sucks? (p192) First, the passage of time brings new conditions which the old formula no longer fits. Second, in stock-market affairs the popularity of a trading theory has itself an influence on the market’s behavior which detracts in the long run from its profit-making possibilities. Ø The average investor cannot deal successfully with price movements by endeavoring to forecast them. It is impossible for average investor to buy low and sell high (p192). Ø In general, the shares of second-line companies (companies not included in SP500) fluctuate more widely than the major one (P196). Ø The stock-market contains a built-in contradiction (p198). The better a company’s record and prospects, the less relationship the price of its shares will have to their book value. The better quality of a common stock, the more speculative it is likely to be. It might be best for him to concentrate on issues selling at a reasonably close approximation to their tangible-asset value – say, at not more than 1/3 above that figure. Ø Single most important paragraph (p203) Ø The true investor scarcely ever is forced to sell his shares, and at all other times he is free to disregard the current price quotation. He need pay attention to it and act upon it only to the extent that the price is favorable enough to justifying selling the stock, and no more. Thus the investor who permits himself to be stampeded or unduly worried by unjustified market declines in his holdings is perversely transforming his basic advantage into back disadvantage. That man would be better off if his stocks had no market quotation at all, for he would then be spared the mental anguish caused him by other persons’ mistakes of judgment. Ø The brilliant Mr. Market metaphor (p204). Ø A long term bond could vary widely in market price in response to changed in interest rates (p207). Bond yields move inversely to prices, low yields meant that prices had risen – making investors most eager to buy just as bonds were at their most expensive and as their future returns were almost guaranteed to be low. This provides another proof of Graham’s lesson that the intelligent investor must refuse to make decisions based on market fluctuations (p208). · Handicaps mutual fund managers and other professional investors are saddled with (p218): 1. Billion dollars of management push them to gravitate toward the biggest stocks. Thus many funds end up owning the same few overpriced giants. 2. Investors tend to pour more money into funds as market rises. The managers use that new cash to buy more of the stocks they already own, driving prices to even more dangerous heights. 3. If fund investors ask money back when the market drops, the managers may need to sell stock, with a market cheaper price. 4. Many managers obsessively measure their returns against benchmarks like SP500 due to bonuses. If a company gets added to an index, hundreds of funds compulsively buy it. 5. Increasingly, fund managers are expected to specialize. They have to buy only “large blend”, “small growth”, or only “mid-sized value” stocks. And sell a company if it gets too big/small/cheap/expensive – even if the manager loves the stock. · You can not control the stocks/funds you buy will outperform the market. But you can control (p219): 1. Your brokerage costs, by trading rarely, patiently, and cheaply. 2. Your ownership costs, by refusing to buy MF with excessive annual expenses. 3. your expectations 4. your risk, by how much to put in market, by diversifying, and by rebalancing 5. your tax bills, by holding stocks for at least one year 6. your own behavior · The intelligent investor should be perfectly comfortable owing a stock or MF even if the stock market sopped supplying daily prices for the next 10 years. · Closed-End versus Open-End Funds and the math about them p238, p239. Closed-end stock funds are not popular. But there are many closed-end bond funds. The ETFs can be worth exploring as well. However, they are generally not suitable for investors who wish to add money regularly (p252). · Buying funds based purely on their past performance is one of the stupidest things an investor can do (p243): Ø The average fund does not pick stocks well enough to overcome its costs of researching and trading them; Ø The higher a fund’s expenses, the lower its returns. Ø The more frequently a fund trades its stocks, the less it tends to earn; Ø Highly volatile funds, which bounce up and down more than average, are likely to stay volatile’ Ø Funds with high past returns are unlikely to remain winners for long. · Why don’t more winning funds stay winners (p245)? Ø Migrating managers: Every one wants them—including rival funds Ø Asset elephantiasis: Huge amount of money pouring in to high return funds leaving managers with few bad choices. He can put the new money into the stocks he already owns which would be overvalued already. He can buy new stocks he didn’t like well enough to own already. Ø No more fancy footwork: some companies specialize in “incubating” their funds-test-driving them privately before selling them publicly. They can work best with small sums of money, like buying truly tiny stocks or rapid-fire trading of IPOs. The fund can lure public with the result. In other cases, the fund manager “waives” (or skips charging) management fees, raising the net return—then slaps the fees on later after the high returns attract plenty of customers. Ø Rising expenses: it often costs more to trade stocks in very large blocks than in small ones. With operating expenses averaging 1.5%, and trading costs at around 2%, the typical fund ($10 billion) has to beat the market by 3.5%. Ø Sheepish behavior: once a fund become successful, its managers tend to become timid and imitative. So the biggest funds resemble a herd of identical and overfed sheep, all moving in sluggish lockstep, all saying “baaaa” at the same time. · What, then, should the intelligent investor do (p248)? Index fund will beat most funds over the long run. Vanguard Total Stock Market. · What qualities do the funds beat the index have in common (p250)? Ø Their managers are the biggest shareholders (at least 1%). You can find the information from EDGAR database at www.sec.gov. Ø They are cheap. Research has proven that funds with higher fees earn lower returns over time. Ø They dare to be different. Compare the holdings listed in its latest report against the roster of the SP500 index. Ø They shut the door. The best funds often close to new investors—permitting only their existing shareholders to buy more. But the closing should occur before—not after—the fund explodes in size. Ø They don’t advertise. Some good funds name (p251) · What else you should watch for (p251)? 1. Fund expenses: Since they are far more predictable than its future risk or return, you should make them your first filter. Annual operating expenses should less than the following lists: Taxable and municipal bonds: 0.75% U.S. equities (large and mid-sized stocks) 1.0% High-yield (junk) bonds 1.0% U.S. equities (small stocks) 1.25% Foreign stocks 1.50% Easily to find in money.cnn.com or www.morningstar.com 2. Evaluate risk. In its prospectus (buyer’s guide), every fund must show a bar graph displaying its worst loss over a calendar quarter. Make sure you can stand losing at least that much money in three months. Do the quality check home work (listed in the previous paragraph). Then, and only then, consult their Morningstar rating. 3. Finally, look at past performance; remember that it is only a pale predictor of future returns. Stupid investors looks at those same things—but in the opposite order. · When should you sell a fund? The standard advise is to ditch a fund if it underperforms the market for one—or is it two?—or is it three?—years in a row. Here a few definite red flags (p254): Ø A sharp and unexpected change in strategy, such as a “value” find loading up on technology stocks in 1999 or a “growth” fund buying tons of insurance stocks in 2002; Ø An increase in expenses, suggesting that the managers are lining their own pockets; Ø Large and frequent tax bills generated by excessive trading; Ø Suddenly erratic returns, as when a formerly conservative fund generates a big loss (or even produces a giant gain) · If you are not prepared to stick with a fund through at least three years, you shouldn’t buy it in the first place. · The investor and his advisers: suggestions, websites (p257 Chapter 10) · Bond analysis: the chief criterion used for corporate bonds is the number of times that total interest charges have been covered by available earnings for some years in the past. In the case of preferred stocks, it is the number of times that bond interest and preferred dividends combined have been covered (p283). Today you should use mutual funds invest in corporate bonds (p283n). Table of Recommended Minimum Coverage" for Bonds and Preferred Stocks (p284). Other generally applied tests include: (1) size of enterprise; (2) stock/equity ratio; (3) property value. · Common stock analysis (p288). The ideal analysis leads to a valuation of the issue which can be compared with current price to determine whether or not the security is an attractive purchase. This valuation , in turn, would ordinarily be found by estimating the average earnings over a period of years in the future and then multiplying that estimate by an appropriate “capitalization factor”. Though average future earnings are supposed to be the chief determinations of value, there are also some other factors affecting capitalization rate. Thus, although two companies may have the same figure of expected EPS, say $4, the analyst may value one as low as 40 and the other as 100. (p290) 1. General Long-Term Prospects: no one really knows anything about what will happen in the distance future. History proves Wall Street’s “experts” forecasters are equally inept at predicting of 1) the market as a whole, 2) industry sectors, and 3) specific stocks. From commentary (p303): you should download at least 5 years’ worth of annual reports (Form 10-k) from EDGAR database at www.sec.gov to help answer two major questions. What makes this company grow? Where do and where will its profits come from? Among the problems to watch for: à The company is a “serial acquirer”. An average or more than two or three acquisitions a year is a sign of potential trouble. Watch out firms that wolf down big acquisitions, only to end up vomiting them back out. Other firms take chronic write-offs, or accounting charges proving that they overpaid for their past acquisitions. That is a bad omen for future deal making. You can usually find details on acquisitions in the “Management’s Discussion and Analysis” section of Form 10-K; cross=check it against the footnotes to the financial statements. à The company is an OPM addict, borrowing debt or selling stock to raise boatloads of Other People’s Money. Read the “Statement of Cash Flows”. This page breaks down the cash inflows and outflows into “operating activities”, “investment activities”, and “financing activities”. If cash from operating activates is consistently negative, while cash from financing activities is consistently positive, the company has a habit of caving more cash than its own businesses can produce—and ou should not join the “enablers” of that habitual abuse. à The company is a Johnny-One-Note, relying on one customer (or handful) for most of its revenues. As you study the sources of growth and profit, stay on the lookout for positives as well as negatives. Among the good signs: à The company has a wide “moat”, or competitive advantages such as a strong brand identity (Harley Davidson, whose buyers tattoo the company’s logo onto their bodies), a monopoly or near- monopoly on the market, economies of scale, or the ability to supply huge amounts of goods or services cheaply (Gillette, which churns out razor blades by the billion), a unique intangible asset (Coca-Cola ), a resistance to substitution (most businesses have no alternative to electricity so utility companies are unlikely to be supplanted any time soon). à The company is a marathoner, not a sprinter. From income statement, you can see whether revenues and net earning s have grown smoothly and steadily over the previous 10 years. The fastest-grown companies tend to overheat and flame out. If earnings are growing at a long-term rate of 10% pre tax (6~7% after tax), that may be sustainable. But the 15% and even higher or sudden burst of growth in one or two years—is all but certain to fade. à The company sows and reaps. No matter how good its products or how powerful its brands, a company must spend some money to develop new business. Check its research and development spending. 2. Management: On Wall Street a great deal is constantly said on this subject, but little that is really helpful. The management factor is most useful in those cases in which a recent change has taken place that has not yet had the time to show its significance in the actual figures. From commentary (p305) à Read the past annual reports to see what forecasts the managers made and if they fulfilled them or fell short. à Managers should forthrightly admit their failures and take responsibility for them,, rather than blaming all-purpose scapegoats like “the economy”, or “weak demand”. à Check whether the tone and substance of the chairman’s letter stay constant, or fluctuate with the latest fads on Wall Street. à Are they looking out for No.1? A firm pays its CEO $100 million/year had better have a very good reason. Otherwise, this suggests that the firm is run by the managers, for the managers. à If company re-prices / re-issues / exchanges its stock options for insiders, stay away. In this switcheroo, a company cancels existing (and typically worthless) stock options for employees and executives, and then replaces them with new ones at advantageous prices. If their value is never allowed to go to zero, while their potential profit is always infinite, how can options encourage good stewardship of corporate assets? à “Option overhang”: AOL Time Warner, for example, reported in annual report that it had 4.5 billion shares of common stock outstanding, but a footnote in the bowels of the report reveals that the company had issued options on 657 million more shares. So AOL’s future earnings will have to be divided among 15% more shares. à “From 4” (EDGAR from www.sec.gov ) shows whether a firm’s senior executives and directors have been buying or selling shares. Repeated big sales are a bright red flag. A manager can’t legitimately be your partner if he keeps selling while you are buying. à Are they managers or promoters? Executives should spend most of their time managing their company in private, not promoting it to the investing public. They should not 1) complain that their stock is undervalued no matter how high it goes; 2) give earnings guidance or guesstimates of the company’s quarterly profits; 3) constantly spewing forth press releases boasting of temporary, trivial, or hypothetical “opportunities”. 8-K filings made by Expeditors International of Washington periodically post its superb question-and-answer dialogues with shareholders there. à Whether the company’s accounting practices are designed to make its financial results transparent—or opaque? The followings are not good: “nonrecurring” charges keep recurring, “extraordinary” items crop up so often that they seem ordinary, acronyms like EBITDA take priority over net income, or “pro forma” earnings are used to cloak actual losses. 3. Financial Strength and Capital Structure: With same EPS, it is clearly a better purchase for a company with a lot of surplus cash and nothing ahead of the common than another one with large bank loans and senior securties. A modest amount of bonds or preferred stock, however, is not necessarily a disadvantage to the common, nor is the moderate use of seasonal bank credit. (Incidentally, a top-heavy structure—too little common stock in relation to bonds and preferred—may under favorable conditions make for a huge speculative profit in common. This is the factor known as “leverage.”) From commentary (p308): the most basic possible definition of a good business is: it generates more cash than it consumes. à First check from cash flows whether cash from operations has grown steadily throughout the past 10 yeas. à Further for Warren Buffet’s concept of “owner earnings” owner earnings = net income + amortization +depreciation – normal capital expenditures As xxx puts it, “if you owned 100% of this business, how much cash would you have in your pocket at the end of the year?” It adjusts for accounting entries like amortization and depreciation that do not affect the company’s cash balances. You should also subtract from net income for fine-tune the definition of owner earnings: Any costs of granting stock options, which divert earnings away from existing shareholders into the hands of new inside owners Any “unusual”, “nonrecurring”, or “extraordinary” charges. Any “income” from the company’s pension fund. If owner earnings per share have grown at a steady average of at least 6% or 7% over the past 10 years, the company is a stable generator of cash, and its prospects for growth are good. à Next, look at capital structure 1) Long-term debt should be under 50% of total capital 2) In the footnotes to the financial statements, determine whether the long-term debt is fixed-rate or variable (with payments that fluctuate, which could become costly if interest rates rise). 3) Look “ration of earnings to fixed charges”. Amazon’s earnings fell $145million short of covering its interest costs. In the future, Amazon will either have to earn much more from its operations or find a way to borrow money at lower rates. Otherwise, the company could end up being owned not by its shareholders but by its bondholders. 4. Dividend Record: continuous dividend payment for the last 20 years or more is an important plus factor. From commentary (p308): à The company should show how well they use cash if not pay dividend. à Companies that repeatedly split their shares treat their investors like dolts. à Companies should buy back their shares when they are cheap—not when they are at or near record highs. It is a waste of company’s cash since the real purpose of that maneuver is to enable top executives to reap multimillion –dollar paydays by selling their own stock options in the name of “enhancing shareholder value” 5. Current dividend rate: Percentage companies distribute of their earnings. In 1969 it was 59% for DJIA 30, 55% for all companies. In 2000, it was only 25.3% for SP 500. · Capitalization Rates for Growth Stocks (p295) Value = Current (Normal) Earnings * (8.5 plus twice the expected annual growth rate) The growth figure should be that expected over the next 7 to 10 years. Investor should introduce a margin of safety into the calculation. · A Two-Part Appraisal Process (p299) 1. The past performance value. This would indicate what the stock would be worth—absolutely, or as a percentage of DJIA/SP500—if it is assumed that it’s relative past performance will continue unchanged in the future. This process could be carried out mechanically by applying a formula that gives individual weights to past figures for profitability, stability, and growth, and also for current financial condition. 2. Consider to what extent the value based solely on past performance should be modified because of new conditions expected in the future. Such a procedure would divide the work between senior and junior analysts (p300). Example p321. · Groups in which the future appears reasonable predicable. They are ideally, would not be overly dependent on such unforeseeable factors as fluctuating interest rates or the future direction of prices for raw materials like oil or metals. Possibilities might be industries like gaming, cosmetics, alcoholic beverages, nursing homes, or waste management (p301n). · Things To Consider About Per-Share Earnings (p310) 1. Don’t take a single year’s earning seriously. Use 7 to 10 years average earnings. It will solve the problem of what to do about nearly all the special charges and credits (p319). Also, the growth rate itself should be calculated by comparing the average of the last three years with corresponding figures then years earlier. Average earnings 1968-1970 $4.95 Average earnings 1958-1960 $2.08 Growth 141.0% Annual Rate (compounded) 9.0% (p320) 2. If you do pay attention to short-term earnings, look out for booby traps in the per-share figures (p310). It is necessary for investors to be on their guard against accounting factors that may impair the true comparability of the numbers (p316): à The use of special charges , which may never be reflected in the per-share earnings. Charge –offs a huge amount of money / per share. Be careful of companies that chronically exclude bad news from their financial results on the pretext that negative events are “extraordinary” or nonrecurring”. They should not charge the loss off as a “special item” (p312). à The reduction in the normal income- tax deduction by reason of past losses. Say nothing about the future tax savings from these losses (p314); Federal tax law allows corporations to “carry forward” their net operating losses. These losses can be carried forward for up to 20 years, reducing the company’s tax liability for the entire period (and thus raising its earnings after tax). Therefore, investors should consider whether recent severe losses could actually improve the company’s net earnings in the future (p318n). à Dilution factor implicit in the existence of substantial amounts of convertible securities or warrants. Large amounts of convertible debt or multiple offerings of common stock (p311). à By anticipating future losses the company escapes the company escapes the necessity of allocating the losses themselves to an identifiable year. They may show up in the year 20xx, but they don’t belong in that year. They won’t be shown in the year when they are actually taken, because they have already been provided for. à To charge off as much as possible to the bad year, which had already been written off mentally and had virtually receded into the past, leaving the way clear for nicely fattened figures in the next few years (p314). à Set up “contingency reserves” out of the profits of good years to absorb some of the bad effects of depression years to come (p315). It mistakes the true EPS. à Treating depression—chiefly between the “straight-line” and the “accelerated”. A example company report 20% increase in EPS—but half of this came from returning to the older straight-line depreciation rates, less burdensome on earnings than the accelerated method used the year before. à The choice between charging off research and development costs in the year they are incurred or amortizing them over a period of years. à Choice between the FIFO (first-in-first-out) and LIFO (last-in-first-out) methods of valuing inventories. à “Pro forma” or “as if” financial statements, which report a company’s earnings as if Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) did not apply (p316n). Example could be found in p322: what a company would have earned over the past year if another firm it just acquired had been part of the entire 12 months; if it had not paid $xxx in preferred-stock dividends; if it had not paid $xxx in payroll taxes on stock options exercised by its employees; if had not lost $xxx investing in lousy stocks; if it had not incurred $xxx in charges related to mergers and goodwill. The only thing you should do with pro forma earnings is ignore them (p323). à Dilutive effect of issuing millions of stock options for executive compensation, then buying back millions of shares to keep those options from reducing the value of the common stock (p316n). à Unrealistic assumptions of return on the company’s pension funds, which can artificially inflate earnings in good years and depress them in bad (p316n). Is the “net pension benefit” more than 5%of the company’s net income? If so, would you still be comfortable with the company’s other earnings if those pension gains went away in future years? Is the assumed “long-term rate of return on plan assets” reasonable? (p328) à “Special Purpose Entities” or affiliated firms (son company) of partnerships that buy risky assets or liabilities of the company and thus “remove” those financial risks from the company’s balance sheet (p316n). à Treatment of marketing or other “soft” costs as assets of the company, rather than as normal expenses of doing business. (p316n). Global Crossing spent more than $600M to construct its optical web. That year, nearly a third of the construction budget was charged against revenues as an expense called “cost of capacity sold”. The next year, says a bland footnote in the 1999 annual report, Global Crossing “initiated service contract accounting.” The company would no longer charge most construction costs as expenses against the immediate revenues it recei9ved from selling capacity on its network. Instead, a major chunk of those construction costs would now be treated not as an operating expense but as a capital expenditure—thereby increasing the company’s total assets, instead of decreasing its net income (p325). P325n has more. Capital expenditures are an essential tool for managers to make a good business grow bigger and better. But malleable accounting rules permit managers to inflate reported profits by transforming normal operating expenses into capital assets. The intelligent investor should be sure to understand what, and why, a company capitalizes. à Aggressive Revenue Recognitions (p324) is often a sign of dangers that run deep and loom large. A communication company Qwest decided to recognize the revenues from its telephone directories as soon as the phone books were published—even though, as anyone who has ever taken out a Yellow Pages advertisement knows, many businesses pay for those ads in monthly installments (p323 p324n). You can find annual report from 8K and 10-K. The company’s stock price dropped sharply and it is not the only cost associated with bogus earnings. The company had overpaid $320million in Federal income tax. Although much of that money will eventually be refunded by the IRS, most shareholders are unlikely to stick around to benefit from the refunds. à Inventory: Micro Technology was hit so hard by the plunge in demand that it had to start writing down the value of its inventories—since customers clearly did not want them at the prices Micron had been asking. Micron booked further inventory write-downs in every one of the next six fiscal quarters. Was the devaluation of Micron’s inventory a nonrecurring event, or had it become a chronic condition? (p327) à How to read financial report? (p328) Read back wards: start reading on the last page and slowly work your way toward the front. Read the notes: Usually labeled “summary of significant accounting policies” (a good example in p328n). In the other footnotes, watch for disclosures about debt, stock options, loans to customers, reserves against losses, and other “risk factors” that can take a big chomp out of earnings. Be careful of technical terms like “capitalized”, “deferred”, and “restructuring”—and plain English words signaling that the company has altered its accounting practices, like “began”, “change”, and “however.” None of those words mean you should not buy the stock, but all mean that you need to investigate further. Compare the footnotes with those in the financial statements of at least one competitor. Three good books are on financial statement analysis. · Chapter 13: A Comparison of Four Listed Companies (p333) 1. Profitability. à Earnings / book value; Net per share / book value, which measures the companies’ net income as a percentage of their tangible book value. Shareholders’ equity also includes intangible items such as brand names, reputations. à Profit (net income) /sales; ration of operating income to sales. 2. Stability. à Measured by the maximum decline in EPS in any one of the past ten years, as against the average of the three preceding years. 3. Growth. à Average 1968-1979 vs. average 1963-1965 à It often proves much more difficult to continue to grow at a high rate after volume and profits have already expanded to big totals (p335). 4. Financial Position. à Current assets / current liability should 2. à Working capital / debt à Long-term debt à Dilution: treating the preferred as if converted into common. 5. Dividends. à What really counts is the history of continuance without interruption. à Dividend yield: dividend/ price. 6. Price History. à 1936-1968 low and high. à Last two year’s low and high · Chapter 14: Stock Selection for The Defensive Investor (p347) The defensive investor will purchase only high-grade bonds plus a diversified list of leading common stocks. 1. Adequate size. à Not less than $2 billion as of 2003. Index fund list (p369). 2. A sufficiently strong financial condition. à Current assets / current liability should 2. à Long term debt net current asset (working capital). 3. Earning stability. à No earnings deficit in the past ten years 4. Dividend record. à Continued dividends for at least the past 20 years à Half of the SP500 companies have met this criteria (p371) 5. Earnings Growth. à A minimum increase of at least 1/3 in EPS in the past 10 years using three-year averages at the beginning and end. Among SP500, 264 met 33%, 245 met 50%, 198 met 100% (p374). 6. Moderate P/E Ratio à 15 (average of the past 3 years). à The forward P/E is non sense. 59% of Wall Street’s “consensus” earnings forecasts miss the mark by a mortifyingly wide margin. 7. Moderate Ration of Price to Assets. à P/E * P/Book value 22.5. (15*1.5) In recent years, an increasing proportion of the value of companies has come from intangible assets like franchises, brand names, and patents and trademarks. Since these factors (along with goodwill from acquisitions) are excluded from the standard definition of book value (???), most companies today are priced at higher price-to-book multiples than in Graham’s day (p374). à In early 2003, the yield on 10-year, AA-rate corporate bonds was around 4.6%, suggesting that a stock portfolio should have an earnings-to-price ratio at least that high. Than P/E should 100/4.6%=21.7. Graham recommends that the “average” stock be priced about 20% below the “maximum” ratio. That means stocks P/E 17 here. As of December 31, 2002, 40% of SP 500 had three-year average P/E ratios 17.0 or lower. Updated AA bond yield can be found at www.bondtalk.com (p350n) Yahoo also has. 8. An easy-to-use online stock screener www.quicken.com/investments/stocks/search/full. 9. Institution ownership percentage can be found in http://quicktake.morningstar.com , yahoo, quicken. Anything over 60% suggests that a stock is scarcely undiscovered and probably “over-owned". (When big institutions sell, they tend to move in lockstep ( 密集，连锁步伐 ), with disastrous results for the stock. Those websites will also tell you who the largest owners of the stock are. If they are money-management firms that invest in a style similar to you own, that’s a good sign (p375) 10. Table of “good” companies as of December 31, 2002, should do more research (p370) · Public utility stocks. Utility stocks are vastly more volatile than they were in Graham’s day, and most investors should own them only through a well-diversified, low-cost fund like the Dow Jones U.S. Utilities Sector Index Fund (IDU) or Utilities Select Sector SPDR (XLU). Some websites (p356n) · Financial Enterprises stocks Today the financial-service industry is made up of even more components, including commercial banks; savings loan and mortgage-financing companies; consumer-finance firms like credit-card issuers; money managers thrust companies; investment banks and brokerages; insurance companies; and firms engaged in developing or owning real estate, including real-estate investment trusts. Although the sector is much more diversified today, Graham’s caveats about financial soundness apply more than even. · The future it self can be approached in two different ways, which may be called the way of prediction (or projection) and the way of protection (p364). All investors labor under a cruel irony: We invest in the present, but we invest for the future. And, unfortunately, the future is almost entirely uncertain. Inflation and interest rates are undependable; economic recessions come and go at random; geopolitical upheavals like war, commodity shortages, and terrorism arrive without warning; and the fate of individual companies and their industries often turns out to be the opposite of what most investors expect. Therefore, investing on the basis of projection is a fool’s errand; even the forecasts of so-called experts are less reliable than the flip of a coin. For most people, investing on the basis of protection -from overpaying for a stock and from overconfidence in the quality of their own judgment-is the best solution. · Chapter 15: Stock Selection for The Enterprising Investor (p376) 1. Mutual Fund, on average, under-perform the market by a margin roughly equal to their operating expenses and trading costs (p377n) why? à The work of the security analyst—however intelligent and thorough—must be largely ineffective, because in essence he is trying to predict the unpredictable. With hundreds, even thousands, of experts studying the value factors behind an important, it would be natural to expect that its current price would reflect pretty well the consensus of informed opinion on its value. Those who would prefer it to other issues would do so for reasons of personal partiality or optimism that could just as well be wrong as right (see EMH). à You are betting for the growth. à As discussed in the commentary of Chapter 9, there are other reasons: low returns on the funds’ cash balances and the high costs of researching and trading stocks. Also, a fund holding 120 companies (a typical number) can trail (behind) the SP500 if any of the other 380 companies in that benchmark turns out to be a great performer. 2. A Summary of the Graham-Newman Methods. à Arbitrages: the purchase of a security and simultaneous sale of one or more other securities into which it was to be exchanged under a plan of reorganization, merger, or the like à Liquidations: purchase of shares which were to receive one or more cash payments in liquidation of the company’s assets. à Related Hedges: the purchase of convertible bonds or convertible preferred shares, and the simultaneous sale of the common stock into which they were exchangeable (p382). An “unrelated” hedge involves buying a stock or bond issued by one company and short-selling ( or betting on a decline in) a security issued by a different company. A “related” hedge involves buying and selling different stocks or bonds issued by the same company (p382n). 3. Secondary Company Stock Guide. à P/E 10 at 1970 à Price is no less than $1 à Financial condition: (a) current assets / current liabilities 1.5; (b) debt 110% net current assets. à Earnings stability: No deficit in the last 5 years à Dividend record: some current dividend. à Earnings growth: Last year’s earnings more than those of 4 years ago. à Price: less than 120 % net tangible assets. à Issue ranked by Standard Poor’s as average or better in quality. · Things about good will In Graham’s terms, a large amount of goodwill can result from two causes: a corporation can acquire other companies for substantially more than the value of their assets, or its own stock can trade for substantially more than its book value (p389n). if the market does not like a company, not only renowned trade names but land, buildings, machinery, and what you will , can all count for nothing in its scales (p392). · Special Situations or “Workouts” (p393). Three cases: 1. B announced a plan to acquire control of K by giving 4/3 shares of its own stock in exchange for one share of K. On the following day, in active trading. B closed at 26 and K at 28. If an “operator” had bought 300 shares of K and sold 400 B at these prices and if the deal were later consummated on the announced terms, he would have had a profit of 24%. 2. NB offered to buy control of APC at $11 in cash. The stock was selling at about 8.5; it closed the month at 9. Here the gross profit indicated was originally about 25%. 3. UMC, which had ceased its business operations, asked its shareholders to ratify dissolution of the concern. The treasurer indicated that the common stock had a book value of $28.5/share, a substantial part of which was in liquid form. The stock closed 1970 at 21.5, indicating a possible gross profit here, if book value was realized in liquidation, of more than 30%. · Merger arbitrage is wholly inappropriate for most individual investors (p394). An increasing proportion of the mergers announced failed to be consummated. Reasons include antitrust intervention, shareholder opposition, change in “market conditions,” unfavorable indications from further study, inability to agree on details, and others. · Looking Under The Right Rocks Many of the best professional investors first get interested in company when its share price goes down, not up. Look at the daily list of new 52-week lows in the WSJ or similar table in the “Market Week” section of Barron’s. · Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) p398 Net income / EPS have been distorted by factors like stock-option grants and accounting gains and charges. ROIC = Owner Earnings / Invested Capital Owner Earnings = Operating Profit + Depreciation + Amortization of good will – Income tax (paid at the company’s average rate) – cost of stock options – “Maintenance” (or essential) capital expenditures – any income generated by unsustainable rates of return on pension funds (as of 2003, anything greater than 6.5%) Invested Capital = Total Assets + past accounting charges that reduced invested capital – Cash (as well as short-term investments and non-interest-bearing current liabilities) ROIC has the virtue of showing, after all legitimate expenses, what the company earns from its operating businesses—and how efficiently it has used the shareholders’ money to generate that return. An ROIC of at least 10% is attractive; even 6% or 7% cab be tempting if the company has good brand names, focused management, or is under a temporary cloud. · What a company’s parts are worth? Check “comparables”, or the prices at which similar businesses have been acquired over the years. It is painstaking and difficult work: start by looking at the typically lists the industrial sector, revenues, and earnings of each subsidiary (the “Management Discussion and Analysis” may also be helpful.) Then search a news database like Factiva, ProQuest, or LexisNexis for example of the other firms in the same industries that have recently been acquired. Using the EDGAR to locate their past annual reports, you may be able to determine the ratio of purchase price to the earnings of those acquired companies. You can then apply that ratio to estimate how much a corporate acquirer might pay for a similar division of the company you are investigating. By separately analyzing each of the company’s divisions this way, you may be able to see whether they are worth more than the current stock price. · Make sure the company is leading by people who “think like owners, not just managers” (p399). Two simple test: 1. Are the company’s financial statements easily understandable, or are they full of obfuscation? 2. Are “nonrecurring” or “extraordinary” or “unusual” charges just that , or do they have a nasty habit of recurring? Look for managers who are “good partners”—meaning that they 1. Communicate candidly about problems 2. Have clear plans for allocating current and future cash flow 3. Own sizable stakes in the company’s stock (preferably through cash purchases rather than through grants of options). But do not talk more about the stock price than about the business. Some funds favors firms that limit issuance of stock options to roughly 3% of shares outstanding. Check the back page of the company’s annual report, where the heads of its operating divisions are listed. If there’s a lot of turnover in those names in the first one or two years of a new CEO’s regime, that’s probably a good sign; he’s cleaning out the dead wood. But if high turnover continues, the turnaround has probably developed into turmoil. · Warren Buffett’s approach (p401): He looks for what he calls “franchise” companies with strong consumer brands, easily understandable business, robust financial health, and near monopolies in their markets, like HR Block, Gillette, and the Washington Post Co. Buffett likes to snap up a stock when a scandal, big loss, or other bad news passes over it like a storm cloud—as when he bought Coca-Cola soon after its disastrous rollout of “New Coke” and the market crash of 1987. he also wants to see managers who set and meet realistic goals; build their businesses from within rather than through acquisition; allocate capital wisely; and do not pay themselves hundred-million-dollar jackpots of stock options. Buffett insists on steady and sustainable growth in earnings, so the company will be worth more in the future than it is today. · Chapter 16: Convertible Issues and Warrants (p403) Ø The convertible issues rank as much more important than the warrants. Convertible issues are claimed to be especially advantageous to both the investor and the issuing corporation. The investor receives the superior protection of a bond or preferred stock, plus the opportunity to participate in any substantial rise in the value of the common stock. The issuer is able to raise capital at a moderate interest or preferred dividend cost, and if the expected prosperity materializes the issuer will get rid of the senior obligation by having it exchanged into common stock. Thus both sides to the bargain will fare unusually well. But in exchange for the conversion privilege the investor usually gives up something important in quality or yield, or both. Conversely, if the company gets its money at lower cost because of the conversion feature, it is surrendering in return part of the common shareholders’ claim to future enhancement. Convertible bonds do not automatically offer “the best of both worlds.” Higher yield and lower risk do not always go hand in hand (p404n). Ø As Graham warns, convertible securities always come out of the woodwork near the end of a bull market. Ø Convertible preferred stock now accounts for only 1/8 of the market (p406n). Ø A convertible preferred is safer than the common stock of the same company. It carries smaller risk of eventual loss of principle. But in most cases the common would not have been an intelligent purchase to begin with, at the ruling price, and the substitution of the convertible preferred did not improve the picture sufficiently （ common stock 本身就不咋地） . Furthermore, a good deal of the buying of the convertibles was done by investors who had no special interest or confidence in the common stock but who were tempted by what seemed an ideal combination of a prior claim plus a conversion privilege close to the current market. In a number of instances this combination has worked out well, but the statistics seem to show that it is more likely to prove a pitfall. Even when a profit appears it brings a dilemma with it. Should the holder sell on a small rise/ should he hold for a much bigger advance; if the issue is called—as often happens when the common has gone up considerably –should he sell out then or convert into and retain the common stock? (p407 with a example) Ø The soundness of investment in convertible issues can only be tested by their performance in a declining stock market—and this ahs always proved disappointing as a whole. In recent years, convertibles have tended to outperform the SP500, but they have typically underperformed other bonds. Ø The real point is that some of the original purchasers converted their bonds into the stock and held the stock through its great decline. In so doing they ran counter to an old maxim of Wall Street, which runs: “Never convert a convertible bond.” Because once you convert you have lost your strategic combination of prior claimant to interest plus a chance for an attractive profit. You have probably turned from investor into speculator, and quite often at an unpropitious time because the stock has already had a large advance (p409). Ø Our general attitude toward new convertible issues is thus a mistrustful one. If a new issue is a really strong one, it is not likely to have a good conversion privilege (p409). Ø The convertible bonds had the important advantage to the company of bringing in a much wider class of buyers since the bonds were popular with many financial institutions which possess huge resources but some of which were not permitted to buy stocks (p410). · Effect of Convertible Issues on the Status of the Common Stock In a large number of cases convertibles have been issued in connection with mergers or new acquisitions. Typically the transaction results in a pro forma increase in the reported earnings per share of common stock; the shares advance in response to their larger earnings. But there are two offsetting factors. 1. Dilution of the current and future earnings that flows arithmetically from the new conversion rights. This dilution can be quantified by taking the recent earnings, or assuming some other figures, and calculating the adjusted EPS if the entire convertible shares or bonds were actually converted. In recent years, convertible bonds have been heavily issued by companies in the financial, health-care, and technology industries. · Switches from Common into Preferred Stocks: profit sometimes (p411) · Stock Option Warrants: we consider them as a near fraud (p413) not common now (p413n) They are unities of an equal number of common shares and warrants to buy additional common shares at the same price. Ordinarily, a common-stock issue has the first right to buy additional common shares when the company’s directors find it desirable to raise capital in this manner. This so-called “pre-emptive right” is one of the elements of value entering into the ownership of common stock—along with the right to receive dividends, to participate in the company’s growth, and to vote for directors. When separate warrants are issued for the right to subscribe additional capital, that action takes away part of the value inherent in an ordinary common share and transfers it to a separate certificate. The company does not derive an advantage (additional capital) from the creation of these warrants. Ordinary there is no way in which the company can require the warrant-holders to exercise their rights, and thus provide new capital to the company, prior to the expiration date of the warrants… large issues of stock-option warrants serve no purpose, except to fabricate imaginary market values (p415). When calculate the P/E, we should combine the value of warrants per share of common stock with price of common stock alone. Will someone soon invent and sell on installments a right to buy a right to buy a share, and so on (p432)? · Commentary for the convert (p418) If you own a convert, you also hold an option: you can either keep the bond and continue to earn interest on it, or you can exchange it for common stock at a predetermined ratio . (An option gives its owner the right to buy or sell another security at a given price within a specific period of time.) Because they are exchangeable into stock, convertibles pay lower rates of interest than most comparable bonds. Example (p418n): 4.75% convertible subordinated notes issued by DC. They pay $47.5 in interest per year and are each convertible into 24.24 shares of the company’s common stock, a “convertible ratio” of 24.24. As of 2002, DC stock was priced at $5.66/share, giving each bond a “convertible value” of $137.2 ($5.66*24.24). Yet the bonds traded roughly 6 times higher, at $881.30—creating a “conversion premium”, or excess over their conversion value, of 542%. (881.30-137.2) / 137.2 = 542%. If you bought at that price, your “break-even time,” or “payback period,” was very long. It going to take (881.30-137.2)/47.50 = 16 years to earn back that conversion premium. From 1957 through 2002, convertible bonds earned and annual average then return of 8.3%—2% below the total return on stocks, but with steadier prices and shallower losses. Note: 8.3% does not include any management fees or trading costs. In the real world, the return would have been roughly 2% lower. Convertibles offer less income and more risk than most other bonds. They act more like stocks than bonds. Most converts are now medium-term, in the 7-10 year range; roughly half are investment-grade; and many issues now carry some call protection. All these factors make them less risky than they used to be. However, most convertible bonds remain junior to other long-term debt and bank loans—so, in a bankruptcy, convertible holders do not have prior claim to the company’s assets. And, while they are not nearly as dicey as high-yield “junk” bonds, many converts are still issued by companies with less than sterling credit ratings. Finally, a large portion of the convertible market is held by hedge funds, whose rapid-fire trading can increase the volatility of prices. List of good convertible bond fund (p420). Never buy it with annual operating expenses exceeding 1.0% · Chapter 17: Four Extremely Instructive Case Histories (p422) 1. Penn Central: an overpriced “tottering giant” with big financial weakness à The interest charges of the PC system are shown to have been earned 1.91 times. It had been paying income taxes for the past 11 years. The coverage of its interest charges before taxes was less than two times—a totally inadequate figure against the conservative requirement of 5 times. à The tact that the company paid no income taxes over so long a period should have raised serious questions about the validity of its reported earnings. à The bonds of the PC could have been exchanged in 1968 at no sacrifice of price or income, for far better secured issues (?) à P/E is about 24, but any analyst worth his salt would have wondered how “real” were earnings of this sort reported without the necessity of paying any income taxes thereon. à In 1966 the newly merged company had reported lovely earnings, but those earnings are before a special charge of $12/share to be taken in 1971 for “costs and losses” incurred on the merger. à The operating picture was very bad in comparison with other company. 2. Ling-Temco-Vought. (p425): an empire building conglomerate; an Serial Acquirers à Quick and unsound “empire building”, become 14th biggest firm with 14 years from a million dollar firm. à Pilling up every possible chare in one year is sometimes called “big bath” or “kitchen sink” accounting. This bookkeeping gimmick enables companies to make an easy show of apparent growth in the following year. à If we deduct the preferred stock at full value an exclude the good-will items and the huge bond-discount “asset,” there would only a much less EPS than reported. The “bond-discount asset” means the LTV had purchased some bonds below their par value and was treating that discount as an asset, on the ground that the bonds could eventually be sold at par. à The debt is extremely high. à The losses in 1969 far exceeded the total profits 3. NVF (p429): an merger in which a tiny firm took over a big one à An extreme example of one corporate acquisition, in which a small company absorbed another seven times its size, incurring a huge debt and employing some startling accounting devices. à The take over terms per share were $70 face amount of NVF junior 5%bonds, due 1994, plus warrants to buy 1.5 shares of NVF stock at $22 per share of NVF. NVF issued $102 million of its 5%bonds and warrants for 2.2 million of its shares. Had the offer been 100% operative the consolidated enterprise would, for the year 1968, have had $163 million in debt, only $2.2 million in tangible stock capital, $250 million of sales. à The Accounting Gimmicks I can not understand (p431) à In 1969, NVF bought in 650k warrants at a price of $9.38 when NVF had only $700k in cash and had $4.4M of debt due in 1970. It was buying in this warrant “paper money” at a time when its 5% bonds were selling at less than 40cents on the dollar—ordinarily a warning that financial difficulties lay ahead. à Changed its method of arriving at its pension costs, and also adopted lower depreciation rates. These accounting changes added about $1/share to EPS. à The market price of the stock and warrants was about $14m against a bonded debt of $135m. 4. AAA Enterprises (p433): an IPO of shares in a basically worthless company à an extreme example of public stock-financing of a small company; its value based on the magic word “franchising” à After IPO, it was selling at 115 P/E or 10 times of its book value. à During 1999 and 2000, many IPOs were deliberately under-priced to “manufacture” immediate gains that would attract more attention of the next offering. 5. Lucent (p438): another huge company à Purchased a company for $4.8 billion—of which $4.8 billion was “good will” though the company had 150 employees, no customers, and 0 revenues. à Lent $1.5 billion to purchasers of its products. It also on hook for $350 billion in guarantees for money its customers had borrowed elsewhere. The total of these “customer financings” had doubled n year—suggesting that purchasers were running out of cash to buy Lucent’s products. What if they ran out of cash to pay their debts for Lucent? à Treated the cost of developing new software as a “capital assets”. 6. Tyco: the acquisition magician à Acquired approximately 200 companies. If Tyco’s strategy of growth-through-acquisition was such a great idea, how come it had to spend an average of $750 million a year clearing up after itself? Tyco called them “merger” or “restructuring” or “other nonrecurring” costs. à Tyco was not in the business of making things—but rather in the business of buying other companies that make things 7. AOL took Time Warner. à This “merger of equals” was designed to give AOL’s shareholders 55% of the combined company—even though Time Warner was five times bigger. à For the second time in three years, the SEC was investigating whether AOL had improperly accounted for marketing costs. 8. eToys à eToys had produced total sales of $30.6m, on which it had run a net loss of $30.8m—meaning that eToys was spending $2 to sell very dollar’s worth of toys. · Chapter 18: A Comparison of 8 Pairs of Companies (p446) Please check the book, some good points listed below. 1. A company can be a giant, or it can deserve a giant P/E ratio, but both together are incompossible (p475). 2. Adding a company to SP 500 would make it compulsory holding for index funds and other big investors—and that sudden rise in demand was sure to drive the stock even higher, at least temporarily. With some 90% of Yahoo’s stock locked up in the hands of employees, venture-capital firms, and other restricted holders, just a fraction of its shares could trade. So thousands of people bought the stock only because they knew other people would have to buy it – and price was no object (p476). 3. In the last five months of 1999, the stock price of CMGI zoomed up to $138, CMGI spent $4.1 billion on acquisitions. Virtually all the “money” was CMGI’s own privately-minted currency: its common stock, now valued at a total of more than $40 billion. It was a kind of magical money merry-go-round. The higher CMGI’s own stock went, the more it could afford to buy. The more CMGI could afford to buy, the higher its stock went. And then, quite suddenly, everything went into reverse. 4. Nortel’s accounts receivable—sales to customers that had not yet paid the bill—had shot up by $1 billion in a year. The company said the rise “was driven by increased sales in the fourth quarter of 1999”. However, inventories had also ballooned by $1.2 billion-meaning that Nortel was producing equipment even faster than those “increased sales” could unload it. Meanwhile, Nortel’s “long-term receivables”—bills not yet paid for multi-year contracts-jumped from $519 million to $1.4 billion. And Nortel was having a hard time controlling costs; its selling, general, and administrative expense (or overhead) had risen from 17.6% of revenues in 1997 to 18.7% in 1999. All told, Nortel had lost $351 million in 1999. · Chapter 19: Shareholders and Managements: Dividend Policy (p487) 1. Share holders are justified in raising questions as to the competence of the management when the results: à Are unsatisfactory in themselves à Are poorer than those obtained by other companies that appear similarly situated à Have resulted in an unsatisfactory market price of long duration. à You should judge the efficiency of management by comparing each company’s profitability, size , and competitiveness against similar firms in its industry (p499) 2. Generally, poor managements are not changed by action of the “public stockholders,” but only by the assertion of control by an individual or compact group. 3. If its operating results and the resulting market price are highly unsatisfactory, it may become the target of successful take-over move. 4. Dividend Policy: in the 1990s, the stronger the company was, the less likely it was to pay a dividend—or for its shareholders to want one. The “payout ratio” (dividends/net income) dropped form 60%~70% in Graham’s day to 35% ~40% by the end of the 1990s (p489n). The company wants to keep the money for growth purpose, the shareholders want to get it. 5. Stock split: its purpose is to establish a slower market price for the single shares. Today, virtually all stock splits are carried out by a change in value. In a three-for-one split, one share becomes three, each trading at a third of the former price. Only in rare cases is a sum transferred “from earned surplus to capital account,” as in Graham’s day (p493n). 6. Subscription rights, often simply know as “rights” 配股 . They confer upon an existing shareholder the right to buy new shares, sometimes at a discount to market price. A shareholder who does not participate will end up owning proportionately less of the company, thus, as is the case with so many other things that go by the name of “rights,” some coercion is often involved. Rights are most common today among closed-end funds and insurance or other holding companies (p495n). 7. A good example: The Enron End-Run (p500). Always read the proxy statement before (and after) you buy a stock. In its proxy statement, which it sends to every shareholder, a company announces the agenda for its annual meeting and discloses details about the compensation and stock ownership of managers and directors, along with transactions between insiders and the company. Share holders are asked to vote on which accounting firm should audit the books and who should serve on the board of directors. If you use your common sense while reading the proxy, this document can be like a canary in a coal mine (p501). 8. While some companies put their cash to good use, many more fell into two other categories: those that simply wasted it, and those that piled it up far faster than they could possibly spend it. 9. A study found that from 1995 through 2001, 61% out of more than 300 large mergers ended up destroying wealth for the shareholders of the acquiring company—a condition known as “the winner’s curse” or “buyer’s remorse”. A similar academic study found that acquisitions of private companies and subsidiaries of public companies lead to positive stock returns, but that acquisitions of entire public companies generate losses for the winning bidder’s shareholders. (p505n) 10. Many companies don’t know how to turn excess cash into extra returns. With interest rates near record lows, such a mountain of cash produces lousy returns if it just sites around. Statistical evidence tells us that when current dividends are low, future corporate earnings also turn out to be low. And when current dividends are high, so are future earnings. In short, most managers are wrong when they say that they can put your cash to better use than you can. Paying out a dividend does not guarantee treat results, but it does improve the return of the typical stock by yanking tat least some cash out of the managers’ hands before they can either squander it or squirrel it way (p506n). 11. What about the argument that companies can put spare cash to better use by buying back their own shares? (p506) When a company repurchases some of its stock, it reduces the number of its shares outstanding. Even if its net income stays flat, the company’s EPS will rise, since its total earnings will be spread across fewer shares. Better yet, unlike a dividend, a buyback is tax-free to investors who don’t sell their shares. And if the shares are cheap, then spending spare cash to repurchases them is an excellent use of the company’s capital. The stock options granted by a company to its executives and employees give them the right (but not the obligation) to buy shares in the future at a discounted price. Because hundreds of millions of options may be exercised in a given year, the company must increase its supply of shares outstanding. Then, however, the company’s total net income would be spread across a much greater number of shares, reducing its EPS. Therefore, the company typically feels compelled to buy back other shares to cancel out the stock issued to the option holders. In 1998, 63.5% of CFO admitted that counteracting. So, it is often: “Sell low, by high.” Other two factors: à Companies get a tax break when executives and employees exercise stock options. Incredibly, although options are considered a compensation expense on a compensation expense on a company’s tax returns , they are not counted as an expense on the income statement in financial reports to shareholders. à A senior executive heavily compensated with stock options has vested interest in favoring stock buybacks over dividends. Why? For technical reasons, options increase in value as the price fluctuations of a stock grow more extreme. But dividends dampen the volatility of a stock’s price (p509n). So if the managers increased the dividend, they would lower the value of their own stock options. · Chapter 20: Margin of Safety (p512) 1. Margin of safety for bonds: à A railroad should have earned its total fixed charges better than 5 times (before income tax), taking a period of years, for its bonds to qualify as investment-grade issues. à Margin of safety for bonds may be calculated, alternatively, by comparing the total value of the enterprise with the amount of debt (A similar calculation may be made for a preferred-stock issue.) If the business owes $10 M and its fairly worth $30M, there is room for a shrinkage of 2/3 in value—at least theoretically—before the bondholders will suffer loss. The amount of this extra value, or “cushion,” above the debt may be approximated by using the average market price of the junior stock issues over a period of years (not using book value). 2. Margin of safety for common stock (p514): à In the ordinary common stock, bought for investment under normal conditions, the margin of safety lies in an expected earning power considerably above the going rate of bonds. Assume in a typical case that the earning power is 9% on the price and that bond rate is 4%; then the stock buyer will have an average annual margin of 5% accruing in his favor. Some of the excess is paid to him in the dividend rate; even though spent by him, it enters into his overall investment result. Over a ten-year period the typical excess of stock earning power over bond interest may aggregate 50% of the price paid. This figure is sufficient to provide a very real margin of safety. à The chief losses to investors come from the purchase of low-quality securities at items of favorable business conditions ( 好年景的滥股 ). The purchasers view the current good earnings as equivalent to “earning power” and assume that prosperity is synonymous with safety. It is in those years that bonds and preferred stocks of inferior grade can be sold to the public at a price around par. à Coverage of interest charges and preferred dividends must be tested over a number of years. So does common-stock earnings if they are to qualify as indicators of earning power. 3. The philosophy of investment in growth stocks parallel in part and in part contravenes the margin-of-safety principle. à The growth-stock buyer relies on an expected earning power that is greater than the average shown in the past. à The average market level of most growth stocks is too high to provide an adequate margin of safety for the buyers, and then a simple technique of diversified (expected) buying in this field may not work out satisfactorily. 4. Diversification is an established tenet of conservative investment (p518). 5. Distinction between conventional and unconventional investments (p520). à Conventional investment portfolio: US government issues and high-grade, dividend paying common stocks; state and municipal bonds for those who will benefit sufficiently by their tax-exempt features; first quality corporate bond when yield sufficiently more than US savings bonds. à Unconventional investment portfolio is suitable only for the enterprising investor. It covers a wide range: undervalued common stocks of secondary companies, which we recommend for purchase when they can be bought at 2/3 or less of their indicated vale; medium-grade corporate bonds and preferred stocks when they are selling at such depressed prices. 6. A sufficiently low price can turn a security of mediocre quality into a sound investment opportunity provided that buyer is informed and experienced and that he practices adequate diversification (p521). There is no such thing as a good or bad stock; there are only cheap stocks and expensive stocks. Even the best company becomes a “sell” when its stock price goes too high, while the worst company is worth buying if its stock goes low enough (p521n). 7. To sum up (p523): Investment is most intelligent when it is most businesslike. Here are the business principles if it is to have a chance of success. à Know what you are doing – know your business: do not try to make “business profits” out of securities—that is, returns in excess of normal interest and dividend income—unless you know as much about security values as you would need to know about the value of merchandise that you proposed to manufacture or deal in. à Do not let anyone else run your business unless (1) you can supervise his performance with adequate care and comprehension or (2) you have unusually strong reasons for placing implicit confidence in his integrity and ability. à Do not enter upon an operation—that is manufacturing or trading in an item—unless a reliable calculation shows that I has fair chance to yield a reasonable profit. à Have te courage of your knowledge and experience. If you have formed a conclusion form the facts and if you know you judgment is sound, act on it—even though others may hesitate or differ. 8. Commentary: à Losing some money is an inevitable part of investing, but you must take responsibility for ensuring that you never lose most or all of your money. Following Graham’s “margin of safety” by refusing to pay too much for an investment, you minimize the chances that your wealth will ever disappear or suddenly be destroyed. à Concludes Bernstein: “In making decisions under conditions of uncertainty the consequences must dominate the probabilities. We never know the future.” Thus, as Graham has reminded you in every chapter of this book, the intelligent investor must focus not just on getting the analysis right. You must also ensure against loss if your analysis turns out to be wrong—as even the best analyses will be at least some of the time. · Appendixes for Important Rules Concerning Taxability of Investment Income and Security Transactions (P561). Glossary: · Hedge fund (p13n): Pool of money, largely unregulated by the government, invested aggressively for wealthy clients. · Gordon equation (p25n): stock market’s future return is the sum of the current dividend yield plus expected earnings of growth.( should also plus inflationary growth see p 85 1.5%to 2.0%+2.4%+1.9%=5.8% to 6.3% Growth + inflation + dividend yield) · TIPS (p26n): bond rises in value if the CPI goes up. · SP (p27n) 500: roughly 70% of the total value of the U.S. equity market. · Selling Short (p32n) · Ticker symbol (p40) · CPI and website (p58) · Municipals (p92) · Moody’s or Standard Poor’s rating (p95) · A bond’s coupon (p98) is its interest rate. A low-coupon bond pays a rate of interest income below the market average. High-coupon 8%, or preferred stocks paying large dividend yields (10%). If a company must pay high rates of interest in order to borrow money, which is a fundamental signal that it is risky. · Bond yield: the market price of a bond may include the accrued interest since the last coupon date. The interest rate adjusted for the current price of the bond is called the current yield or earning yield (this is he nominal yield multiplied by the par value and divided by the price) (wiki). · Bond par value (p136n): bond prices are quoted in percentages of “par value”, or 100. A bond priced at “85” of is selling at 85%of its principal value. · Preferred stocks (p98~99) · Growth stock: the stock has increased its per-share earnings in the past at well about the rate of common stocks generally and is expected to continue to do so in the future (p115). · Emerging markets bond and websites (p158) (foreign bonds) · Control persons (p162n) who have a close relationship with the particular company – senior managers or direcotors. · Net asset value = book value = balance-sheet value = tangible-asset value is total assets-total liabilities (p198). Also suggest to use share holders’ equity subtract all soft assets such as goodwill, trademarks, and other intangibles. · Fund / closed-end fund / open-end fund / balanced / funds / stock-funds / hedge funds / load funds / no-load funds /. Website to find major types of MF (p226, p227) · Regulated investment company or RIC, every mutual fund is taxed as RIC, which is exempt from corporate income tax. · ETF exchange-traded index funds (P253n) · Investment bankers: a firm that engages to an important extent in originating, underwriting, and selling new issues of stocks and bonds. (To underwrite means to guarantee to the issuing corporation, or other issuer, that the security will be fully sold.) Investment banking is perhaps the most respectable department of Wall Street community, because it is here that finance plays its constructive role of supplying new capital for the expansion of industry (p268). The relationship between the investment banker and the investor is basically that of the salesman to the prospective buyer. · Junior / Senior stock issues (p285n): Junior means shares of common stock. Preferred stock is considered “senior” to common stock because the company must pay all dividends on the preferred before paying any dividends on the common. · Dilution (p312n): a stock with high trading volume is said to be “liquid”. When a company goes public in an IPO, it “floats” its shares. A company drastically diluted its shares (with large amounts of convertible debt or multiple offerings of common stock) was said to have “watered” its stock. · Efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) The price of each stock incorporates all publicly available information about the company. With millions of investors scouring the market every day, it is unlikely that severe mis-pricings can persist for long (p363n). The problem with stock market today is not that so many financial analysts are idiots, but rather that so many of them are so smart. As more and more smart people search the market for bargains, that very act of searching makes those bargains rarer—and, in a cruel paradox, makes the analysts look as if they lack the intelligence to justify the search. The market’s valuation of a given stock is the result of a vast, continuous, real=time operation of collective intelligence. Most of the time, for most stocks, that collective intelligence gets the valuation approximately right. Only rarely dose Graham’s “Mr. Market” send prices wildly out of whack. (p380n) · Working Capital = current assets - current liabilities · Net Working Capital = current assets – total liabilities · Long-term debt includes preferred stock, excludes deferred tax liabilities. · Strait Preferred Stock: it issued in perpetuity and pays the stipulated rate of interest to the holder. · A bond is “called” when the issuing corporation forcibly pays it off ahead of the stated maturity date, or final due date for interest payments (p407n). · Profit margin: net earnings / net sales (p484). Net sales is gross sales less returns, allowances, freight, and cash discounts. · “Earning power” is Graham’s term for a company’s potential profits or, as he puts it, the amount that a firm “might be expected to earn year after year if the business conditions prevailing during the period were to continue unchanged”. Graham intended the term to cover periods of 5 years or more. You can crudely but conveniently approximate a company’s earning power per share by taking the inverse of its P/E ratio. A stock with 1 P/E ratio of 11 can be said to have earning power of 9%. Today earning power is often called “earning yield.” (p514n)
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分享 美国种族简史 读书笔记5： 德国移民的历史
热度 22 到处停留的叶子 2012-2-8 07:37
歇了很久，就不去编辑旧日志乐。 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 北美殖民时代的德裔（“宾夕法尼亚荷兰人”的由来和契约奴的故事） 荷兰人的确也是美国重要的早期移民之一，大家都知道纽约本来叫新阿姆斯特丹。不过这里要提到的是同样重要的一族，德意志人。 早期的德意志人那时候是以个人身份参杂在荷兰人的队伍中来美国的，定居于1620年的新阿姆斯特丹。这些德意志人基本上是农民或者工匠出身，或者是在农舍手工作坊干过活的人，有些还是荷兰西印度公司的卫队成员，继承了历史悠久的德国雇佣兵传统。 17世纪后半期，威廉.宾为了他在北美的殖民地宾夕法尼亚招募移民，走访了德意志各邦。当时宾夕法尼亚的宗教比较宽松，对那些与自己所在地区的国立教会持有不同信仰的德意志人来说，格外有吸引力。这样，宾州招徕了第一批数量可观的德裔移民，主要来自莱茵河以西地区。 在1683年，13个信奉梅农教派的家族在宾州建立了日耳曼城，就是今天费城的一部分。然后其它德国教派和当时的异端，包括加尔文教派，阿米什教派等等纷纷效法梅农派，移居宾夕法尼亚。包括后来建立著名的高等学府-穆伦伯格学院的美国路德教派的组织者亨利希.穆伦伯格及其家族。 这就是宾夕法尼亚荷兰人的开始。此处荷兰人，Dutch这个词，实际上是Deutsch，发音两者差不多，美国人把后者读成了前者，而德国人自己听着也差不多，等到弄清楚原来搞错了，已经是很多年以后的事情了。 这么多德意志人集中在宾夕法尼亚一带，在1745年的时候，大约有45，000的德裔居住在这里。他们大多定居在当时的边境上，非常容易受到印第安人的袭击。 德意志人1709年在哈得逊河边建立纽伯格，就是新堡，然后扩展到了莫霍克河谷一带。这里也是和印第安人的边境。来这里的德意志人和更早期的有所不同，他们都是契约奴，就是说他们移民过来时签了契约，一般要做3~7年的苦工，偿还来美的路费。当时来美的白人民众大约有一半是用这个方法移民过来的。德意志人和瑞士人是这个办法的首批试验品，成功后才在苏格兰，爱尔兰和其它种族之间推广开来。定居在莫霍克河谷的德意志人，原本是英国政府的契约劳工，因为英政府垫付了一半他们的旅费和安置费。德国人比其它种族更为普遍的采用这种由英政府暂付部分费用的方法，所以能够整批整批的迁徙，有的是全家老小一锅端，有的是整个村镇一次走光。 纽约和宾州两地的早期德国移民，都来自珀拉蒂纳特，德意志西南部沿莱茵河两岸的一个区域。18世纪的南卡罗来纳州，也在贩卖来自这个地区的德国契约奴方面，干得挺欢。 通常契约劳工的情况是这样的。载运这些劳工的船，先沿着莱茵河而下，几个礼拜后抵达荷兰，然后再起锚开始横渡大西洋的航程。这些船平均要在大海上航行8到10个星期。经受了恶劣天气和疾病的考验，剩下来的人抵达美国港口，打算购买船上的劳工的买主，就登上船来查看行情。那些契约奴被从甲板上叫下来，前后走动，以便让买主们看个仔细。有的买主甚至亲自动手，上前试试他们的肌肉，聊上几句，看看他们的理解力和反应。大部分契约奴由一种名为“苦工引导者”的中间人买走，中间人将他们带到乡下各地巡回，遇到合适的机会再把这些劳工逐个转卖掉。当时，社会上并不认为这种贩卖和交易有何道义上的不妥，公开参与这种交易的有当时最高地位和名望的人士。乔治华盛顿就是其中之一。在1792年，美国新政府还高过一个计划，准备进口德意志劳工来帮助首都华盛顿的建设。 其实很多德意志人在离开家园时，本没有作契约奴的打算，但是后来发现，头一程到了荷兰，然后再搭船赴美，旅费开销不断上涨，超出了原来和船主讲定的价钱。另外有一些人有家人和朋友在美，本来期待他们能够替自己付张船票，而当这些希望落空时，也就只好卖身去当几年苦力了。 不管怎样，他们仍然持续不断的向美国迁移，而且总的来看，数量还越来越大（估计那时候天下乌鸦一半黑。。。） 根据保守估计，1740~1760这20年间，仅仅在费城码头上岸的德意志民族移民，就有6万人，其中一半到2/3是契约奴。 虽然契约奴受到许多和奴隶一样的限制和处罚，但是他们在履约期间，也的确有一些法定的权利，而且契约有终结之日。他们在获得人身自由的时候，还经常可获得一笔为数不大的现金或者土地。当然这些土地往往是在边境和印第安人做邻居。靠近那些看到祖祖辈辈属于自己的土地被他们侵占而深感不快的印第安人，并不是很愉快的事情。这样一些地区定居的白人曾遭到印第安人的杀害或者掠去为奴。 不管他们是怎么来的，也不管飘洋过海和抵达美国之后又经历何等的甜酸苦辣，早期定居的德意志人很快在美国树立了勤劳，周密，节俭的美誉。德国农民在边境垦荒造田，干得比别人更彻底，产量更高。开始他们是泥土房，而后改建为木头房，最后总是用石头建起宽大的农舍。18世纪末的时候有人在文章中写道：“一个德国人的农场，在外观上就和其它人的农场截然不同。德国人的农场牲畜圈特大，农舍简朴但是很紧凑，围栏很高，果园面积很大，土地肥美，草地翠绿，到处是丰衣足食的景象，一切收拾得井井有条。” 大多数早期的德意志移民，对欧洲文明前沿的那些和德意志民族的贡献有关联的科学，技术或者思想智慧也是一窍不通的。他们具有的只是德意志民族之所以能够有那些成就的纪律性，彻底性和坚韧性。他们被誉为全美国最好的自己动手干的农场主。与此同时，德国技术工匠的成就也开始在美国扩展，玻璃制造就是其中之一。还有就是美国第一家造纸厂在德意志人手中诞生。 宾夕法尼亚的荷兰人（也就是德意志人），在两个重要的方面根本不像德意志人：第一他们是和平主义者，第二他们是政府的怀疑者。作为珀拉蒂纳特人，他们的祖先居住在德意志帝国兵家必争之地，三十年的战争中，生灵涂炭。他们又是逃避独裁专制和宗教迫害的难民。宾夕法尼亚的宗教自由，在当时的美国也是罕见，对虔诚而清静的教派，具有格外的吸引力，这个时期的德裔，对政府或者政治没有任何兴趣。如今人们依然可以从阿密什人那里看到这些德意志人的影子。他们与世隔绝，避开现代文明，驾着黑色的马车，不让子女去公立学校就读。 随着时间的流逝，多数德裔移民扩散到其他地区，学会了讲英语，对美国文化既有吸收，也有贡献。流传到今天的影响，恐怕主要体现在烹饪上。而德裔经营的农场，在阿巴拉契亚山谷的沃野上，从南到北扩散开来。到18世纪晚期，德国移民的定居点，在当时的美国西部边疆上，组成了一条连绵不断的锁链，北起纽约州上部的莫霍克谷地，向南，中间经过新泽西州西部，宾州中部，马里兰西部，再跨越弗吉尼亚的谢南多厄河谷和南北卡罗来纳的皮德蒙特丘陵地带，直到佐治亚州的萨瓦那。散见于这一带的地名，仍然能够反映当初德国人定居的历史背景。 在殖民地时代，德裔美国人在扩展自己的农作区时，经常发现和苏格兰-爱尔兰人是邻居。苏格兰爱尔兰人是精明强悍的疆民，他们是先锋，他们善于狩猎捕鱼，垦荒开田，敢于和印第安人开战。德国人和其他种族的人，就跟在后面打顺风车。总体来说，德国人在气质和举止方面，和苏格兰-爱尔兰人迥然不同。德国人整洁，安静，友善，勤劳，节俭，与印第安人也比较合得来。而苏格兰-爱尔兰人则截然相反，他们脾气暴躁，常常喝得烂醉如泥，干起活来三天打鱼两天晒网，没有积蓄，不注意外表形象，蓬头垢面，常常和印地安人打架。两个 民族之间还横亘着宗教的障碍。所以这两个民族在阿巴拉契山谷几百英里长的边疆地带共处了一个多世纪之后，仍然泾渭分明，很少有混血现象。 殖民地时代德意志能工巧匠有两个巨大贡献必须提一下，一个是本来德国人研发出来运载农产品的马车，科内斯托加马车。这种马车后来在美国西进运动中起了重大的作用。但是在西进运动之前，早在1755年，英国人与法国人和印第安人的战争中，就开始用它来运送军需品。后来美国独立战争中也使用过这种马车。不过最后使这种马车名声大振的，还是日后西进运动的到来。美国的西进先锋，就是赶着这种马车，穿越中部的大草原而抵达太平洋沿岸的。当年由这种马车组成的车队，越过激流，也能够排成圆形阵地，击退印第安人的袭击。 第二样就是新式来复枪，宾夕法尼亚德国人研制出来打猎用的。这种枪后来的作用确实是这些和平主义者始料未及的。和当时欧洲的步枪不同的是，德国人造的这种武器在枪管内壁刻有膛线（称为来复线）以提高射击的精度。当初有些来复枪是德国移民从欧洲带到宾州，宾州的德意志巧匠在他们的基础上，研制出一种更新式的来复枪，从而进一步增加了它的准确性。起初这种武器叫“宾夕法尼亚来复枪”，但是后来这种枪到了像丹尼尔.布恩这样百发百中的边民手中，名噪一时，于是改称为“肯塔基来复枪”。到独立战争期间，当美国人用游击战来对付英国人时，这种枪被证明是十分有效的武器。
个人分类: 读书笔记|32 次阅读|0 个评论
分享 美国种族简史 读书笔记3： 爱尔兰人的政治才能
热度 23 到处停留的叶子 2012-1-10 07:45
讲到美国的爱尔兰人，人们一定会想到大名鼎鼎的肯尼迪家族。是的，从第一代肯尼迪于1848年抵达美国，到第四代的约翰肯尼迪当上美国总统，肯尼迪家族可以说是奋斗成功的爱尔兰人典范。 但是对绝大多数的美籍爱尔兰人来说，社会接受他们是缓慢的。他们是美国城市里第一批重要的少数种族。典型的爱尔兰移民，男的干体力活，女的做佣人，他们搬到哪一个街区，那里的原有居民就会全部搬走。他们统统被认为是懒惰肮脏的爱吵架的酒鬼。一直到1890年的统计数据，多数男子依然在干体力活，女的帮人做家务。包括肯尼迪家也是这样，第一代肯尼迪直到去世，一直是个劳工，从他的儿子家境好转，以致能够送第三代肯尼迪去读大学，这位就是约瑟夫肯尼迪，他成了大富翁，从而使得第四代的约翰肯尼迪当上了总统，一位悲剧性的传奇人物。 我很好奇的是为何被主流社会接受缓慢的爱尔兰人能够在美国发展壮大其政治权力？ 书上具体阐述了爱尔兰人当年在母国时的历史经验，就是在英国战胜爱尔兰之后。爱尔兰天主教徒既无选举权，也不准担任公职也不允许上大学或者任教，他们的子女从法律上来讲没有受教育的权利，天主教徒还不允许拥有像样的田产。。。英国人颁布的这些惩罚性法律，就是为了让爱尔兰人永远屈从于一个低的位置。但是这些征服者们没有想到的是这些法律的施行引起的副作用。为了满足本民族的宗教，教育和政治需求，各种各样的秘密基层组织纷纷发展了出来，天主教神父们地下布道，学校秘密上课，强行征税的人，驱赶佃农的地主，往往会受到抵抗分子的袭击。 由于不得不为自己提供通常由政府提供的机构设施，爱尔兰人不但培养了高水平的组织本领，也锻炼出本领规避他们认为是非法压迫他们的政府机构。这两个本领，后来到了美国发展壮大，大有用处。 他们在美国打响的第一炮就是在政治方面，其成就也最引人注目。在大城市，爱尔兰后裔往往是最大的单一种族群，他们在选举时可以借助手里大量的选票而确保其政治影响，这在1830年代已经初见端倪。十九世纪末期，爱尔兰人开始主宰美国大城市政治，尤其是在美国东北部，波士顿，纽约……可以说，他们改造了美国的城市政治。 爱尔兰人在母国的历史经验，使他们学会了在官府法则之外行事的本领和风气，并坚守另一种非正式的行为规范。“爱尔兰人把视正式的政府为非正统，而把非正式的政府示威真正标志主权在民的这种根深蒂固的传统，带到了美国”。贿赂暴力和选举舞弊，构成了爱尔兰政治机器的几大突出特点，但是他们这些弊端又不是随意胡来的，而是高度有组织有控制的。爱尔兰人的政治机器是建立在对个人和组织的忠诚基础上的，其指导原则是实用主义，而非任何意识形态上的纲领。简单说，他们的政治目标是追求权力所带来的油水---高薪，受贿，以及把追随者放到肥缺上。 爱尔兰人的这种腐败政治干得十分漂亮，经常贪污受贿还带有人情味，他们的成功在很大程度上是因为他们的政治对手对城市移民的痛痒漠不关心，穷人宁愿要理解他们的贪官，也不要不理解他们的高高在上的理论家。很多爱尔兰政治首领都是别具一格的传奇人物，比如当时纽约的政治头目“大提姆”沙利文就是这样的一位，他一手从各方接受贿赂，另一手不忘记把食品和衣服分给穷人，1913年他去世的时候，有25000人参加了他的葬礼。 作者总结了爱尔兰人从政方面的几条有利之处，十分有理，在此摘抄一段作为此篇读书笔记的结束。 爱尔兰人在政治竞争中具备许多有利之处。首先，他们有强烈的种族团结感，而犹太人和意大利人则经常发生内讧。其次，爱尔兰人的有利之处还体现在他们来美要早一些，会讲英文！最后，在爱尔兰人的文化中，个人魅力和口齿伶俐是受到赏识的，这两条，对于搞政治显然是巨大的资本。。。
个人分类: 读书笔记|53 次阅读|24 个评论
分享 《精子战争》读书笔记（三）
愚者乐言 2012-1-4 13:44
安全套等现代技术的发展使女人的性伙伴选择范围在扩大；亲子鉴定在严重打击男女哄骗别人替自己抚养孩子的可能，戴戴绿帽子也无妨；经济条件仍然很重要，离婚中的财产分割成为大战焦点，结婚也是优先考虑对象。 现代社会发展出的新策略： 1、 找妓女学习性爱技巧，避免在正常两性交往中过于急色； 2、 承诺戴套进行安全性行为，打消临时性伙伴的犹豫； 3、 容忍同性恋行为和外遇，睁一眼闭一眼，作为打压对方的手段；离婚时也可以凭此争取财产和他人同情；女人总是要被人搞得，只要不会被骗抚养别的男人的孩子，何乐而不为。 4、 极力散布女方作风问题的传言，打压其性魅力和性交往底线，坚决支持艳照门的传播；但是对于男性情敌要小心（同性恋问题才是关键）。坚决劝分不劝合，夸大和挑逗女人对可能的性伴侣的不安全感。 5、 做爱对象可以无所谓，但结婚对象一定要考虑经济条件。现在不结婚也可以搞未婚美处女，结婚可以选择经济和外貌条件好的剩女非处，既可以不用操心养孩子，又可以以之为借口方便乱搞，离婚也方便。 6、 现在的独生子女从小是被人照顾大的，指望他们会照顾人是不可能的。所以要学会照顾自己，不至于在心理上受制于他人，还可以先发制人；主要是学会一手好厨艺，肚子吃饱了就有安全感了。 7、 现在养老，社保等都基本有着落，不必延续养儿防老的旧模式，因此不必忍受婚姻， 40 岁左右（或者孩子 10 岁后）离婚后一身轻松。 8、 为了占据道德制高点，旧有的分手理由都已失效，关键是让女人主动疏远离开你。 9、 对于特别优秀的女性，多数男人自惭形秽不敢追，因此要采取主动大胆略显粗暴的性行为掌控之，让她自己也想不到，才能产生强烈的性臣服心理。 10、 女性也有自己的小圈子，很少单身一人，选择合适的战友共同出击很重要。必要时要牺牲色相拿下女人圈中的首领，首领通常不是最漂亮最性感的，却相对其他女性有权威；对于最漂亮性感的反而要有意识的孤立；连首领都臣服了，其他女人的性臣服也就水到渠成了。 女人只会对强者性臣服。和女性建立亲密关系的前提保证是使其从心理上性臣服于自己。这里的强者包括外在的财富地位强于其他男性；内在的性经验强于其他女性。要么你比其他男人强，要么你搞得其他女人比眼前的要强。性爱的技巧就是利用花招进行欺骗，使女性误认为你有可能比其他男人强，因为聪明女人有倒追其他年轻男人“潜力股”的对冲心理。而女人眼里的优秀女性并非男人眼中最性感最漂亮的女人，漂亮女人早就幸福的去做少奶奶了，哪里还要考虑被男人追的问题。 因此女权主义的标准反而对最优秀的那部分女性不利，对她们而言，已婚的要忍受丈夫的花心和前赴后继的小三；未婚的要与其他女性争宠斗艳，表现的像个骚货，都有可能被羞辱，都有可能成怨妇。 刺激怨妇的方式有：让其感受到孤独与失落；身边没有直接抚养的后代（ 6 岁后的小孩上学后，效果类似）；男方强烈争夺孩子的抚养权；小三给丈夫或情人生下了孩子；身边长期缺乏进行阴道性行为的合适男性；其他不如自己的男人女人享有正常的亲热的亲子关系和家庭生活；实质是让她的身体感受到需要争夺能够受孕的精子。
0 个评论
分享 美国种族简史 读书笔记2： ch.1 美国百衲衣
热度 9 到处停留的叶子 2011-12-22 07:43
第一章 美国百衲衣 首先，令我吃惊的是1970年的家庭收入指数， 全体美国人平均数是100的话，犹太人没有悬念最高（172），日本人排名第二（132），第三的是波兰人（115）这点让我大跌眼镜。不要怪我有歧视，我们这里很多搞家庭清洁工作的就是波兰妇女，口碑是很好的，不过，不过？难道对波兰人来讲，历史又倒退了？这是很有可能的，大概和苏联解体有关吧，新一波的波兰移民只好从头开始。也不知道我猜测得对不对。 排名第四的就是中国人和意大利人（112），接下来是法国人和盎格鲁萨克逊人107，爱尔兰人102。 低于平均水平的依次是菲律宾人99，西印度群岛人94，墨西哥人76，波多黎各人63，黑人62和印第安人60。 我没有想到的是美国黑人的收入水平在1970年竟然还是这么低，简直就是社会的底层，仅仅比印第安人高了两分，要知道黑人可以算是美国的多数人种了。 美国没有少数民族，主要是他们其实没有多数民族。因为根据1973年的数据，可以辨别的最大单一人种是英裔，占15%，然后是德裔13%，黑人11%，是第三大可以辨认的种族。 由于世代杂居混处，千百万美国人说不清自己究竟属于哪一个种族，这才是美国的多数民族。 也怪不得美国的白人一直对黑人有负疚感，因为其他的人种都是自己选择移民到美国的，是苦是乐，他们必须为自己负责，而黑人却是被白人贩卖到北美来的，生活却一直这么差。不知道2000年以后的数据是怎样，应该有很大的变化了吧？ ------------------------------------------------------摘抄--------------------------------------------------------------- 作者说，美国的特殊之处并不在于这些种族之间的仇恨在这个国度存在过（因为这种仇恨几千年来也在其他地方存在过），而在于这种仇恨的程度在逐步减弱，并在某些方面已经消失。 作者描述了19世纪美国的各种族互相对抗现象以及各种暴力行为，当地人和欧裔或亚裔移民之间的种族仇恨曾经频繁导致这样的对抗和暴力，其中丧命的人数之多，远远超过20世纪中叶任何一次种族暴动造成的伤亡。 “在这样一个国家里，多元化并非是人们一开始就抱有的理想，而是互不相容所造成的惨重牺牲，迫使他们彼此相安共处的结果。美国大量的发财致富的机会，也给人们的精力提供了另一条出路，使大家感到对现存物资条件的争夺并没有为全体人民扩大生产来得重要，并使齐心协力者有所报偿，也就顾不上计较那许多分歧了。”
个人分类: 读书笔记|21 次阅读|7 个评论
分享 读书笔记：互联网你到底想干神马？!(二)
热度 12 cadgn 2011-10-7 12:47
上回说到，互联网实际上是更接近人类动物本能的一种媒介，而文字书籍，尤其是＂大部头＂书，却是需要经过训练和学习，才可以适应和掌握的。 那么，＂大部头＂书又是怎样在人类历史上逐渐发展起来，直到成为人类历史文化文明的主要载体的呢？互联网的兴起，对＂大部头＂书，人类的认知思考方式乃至大脑的构造，乃至​人类文明，又会有什么样的影响呢？ 我们先从今天向后看，观察一下文字书籍，这个人类历史载体本身的发展历史。 人，是先学会说话，再学会写字的（废话）。说话并不是人类的专利。稍微不是太古朴的动物都或多或少会一点，有的动物甚至能学会人类的语言。写字好像是人类的专利。写写画画​，见过描自画像的大象，画抽想画的猩猩，但是从来没有能写字的动物。 人类会说话的时间，要比会写字长得多得多，至少有好几万年了。而运气最好的人类社区，也只是在几千年前才开始了码字。大家展开想象力，想象一下在没有文字的环境下，我们怎​样才能＂天天学习，好好向上＂？ 答案，基本靠"聊"。 大早起来，先跟溜鸟的大爷聊聊天气，再跟卖菜的大婶砍砍市价；跟隔壁的MM打听昨晚篝火晚会上不得不说的故事；跟邻居的大兄弟讨论下次狩猎的安排。到了晌 午，正经的学习开​始廖。搬个板凳到村中广场，今天咱村来了个哲学家。那时的哲学家都幽默，讲课就跟马三立似的。要不人记不住，那你的课就白讲了，知识观 点也传不下去。（还有一个技巧是不断​地问听众问题，也能给人深刻印象。西村的老苏，就是这方面的行家。８过，问题太多太尖锐，听众会反弹，这个就不和谐 了，这是后话。） 总之，您看出来了。在书面文字出现前，您要有志成为一个有知识的人，对社会有用的人，您就必须投入到与人面对面交流的伟大事业中去。＂书呆子＂这个概念还 没有。您也可以看​出来，知识的积累和传播，在文字还没有发明的时候走得是个很＂社区化＂的模式。现代的互联网是不是有些神似呢？ 到了几千年前，人们逐渐开始使用文字。文字刚发明时，不是人人都看好的。前文中的哲学家老苏，就唱衰。理由是，用了文字之后，人就不用用自己的脑子记住知识了，记都记不住​，还可能有哲学思想么？！可见唱衰的人什么时候都有，智慧如老苏，亦不免。 一开始，文字是用刀刻在石板，骨头，和龟壳上的，“写”起来很费劲。最初的文字，只是用来纪录简单又重要的信息的，并不会被用来纪录复杂深邃的东东。当时 的人要记些写些什​么，一般不自己动手，而是请专门的“写手”“捉刀人”，你念，他啃吃啃吃地刻。这样的话，即使你复杂深邃，纪录表达也会有折扣。 幼年时的文字，很不成熟。比如说，没有文法，没有段落章节，没有标点符号，有的甚至于还没有“字”的概念－－－只有一串音节。（本书没有涉及中国的象形文字，cad认为象​形文字作为书面语言有一定的优势。）就像这样： “ DrConradMurrayscomplicatedlovelifebecameentangledwiththelifeanddeathofhispatient ​ MichaelJacksonprosecutorssuggestedTuesdayastheycalledaparadeofwomenwitnesseswhor ​eceivedphonecallsfromthedoctorasJacksonwasneardeath ” 与其说是文字，不如说是口语的书面纪录。因此开始的人读“书”，是不可能默念的。必须一个个音节大声读出，才有可能断句，揣莫出个意思来。 人类聪明，突破瓶颈后，通常会有爆发性的发展。造纸和印刷术的发明，打破了书面文字发展的瓶颈。在印刷术发明前，书本是非常昂贵和稀少的，有钱人家置个图 书馆装样子，只要​几本十几本书即可。印刷术刚发明时，古登堡的老板推着一车书去巴黎卖，差点让人当巫师给办了－－－人们不相信一个普通人能趁这么多的 书。 造纸和印刷术的发明后，书籍大爆炸。有人唱衰：书太多了，是个人就能写书，有点钱就能付印。各种思想观点都有，草民们不知道该信哪本书，成何体统！ ”是个人就能写书“的预言的确实现了，但结果却是正面的。当文字书从精英媒介转化成草根媒介后，人类文明百花齐放的程度大大加深了。文学，哲学，科技，艺 术。。。当个人有​机会把奇思妙想，有时超期时代离经判道的东西付诸文字，并可以传诸与世的时候，创造力和多样性被解放了。一时间，大牛与小虾齐飞，板砖 和鲜花一色。 媒介呈载思想，思想又被媒介影响。因为书籍固有的大信息容量，作者有空间充分发展升华自己的思想。现代很多高深的理论，微妙的文学，抽象的科学，如果没有 大部头书籍，很难​想象凭口语媒介发展传承。书籍的写作和阅读都是相对孤独的活动，人的个性和多样性有机会充分生根发芽。如果必须通过＂社区化＂的媒介， 那么特立独行的思想也生存不易。总之​，书籍这个媒介，不仅提供信息知识，还＂诱使＂作者和读者望深里头想，抽象升华自己模糊的观点。这就是媒介影响思维 的概念。 那么现在互联网这个新兴媒介，对人类思维方式又会有什么样的影响呢？
个人分类: 读书|1479 次阅读|3 个评论
分享 读书笔记：互联网你到底想干神马？!
热度 7 cadgn 2011-9-30 14:45
书名：The Shallows: What the Internet Is Doing to Our Brains 作者: Nicholas Carr 本书的题目，＂互联网你到底想干神马？＂, 有点危言耸听阴谋论的味道。（事实上作者好像的确和互联网的最杰出先进生产力代表GOOGLE不对付，颇花费了一些章节腹黑GOOGLE，不过那个不是这篇非常厚道的读书笔记的重点。） 本书的主要论点：人类发明，掌握，应用互联网这个新兴媒介；互联网反过来也影响人类的行为思维, 甚至于改造人的大脑。 几个记得住的方面，随便谈谈： 一，互联网其实是"返祖现象"？ 书中的一个观点是：互联网虽然在科学高度发达的现代才被发明，却是更接近人的天生动物性感知和处理信息方式的一种媒介。 与互联网相对照的，是传统的文字书籍－－－作者称之为线性媒介。什么意思呢？ 看文字书的时候，你心无旁骛，尽量集中注意力排除周围干扰。会看书的人很容易＂看进去＂，达到物我两忘的境界，完全进入作者用文字构造的世界。而且一般人读书是从头到尾，没有太多的分岔，因此书本是线性媒介。 在漫游WWW时，思维是发散的，非线性的，多线程的。。注意力不会长时间地集中在一个地方。你不仅敏感，而且渴望接收到各种纷繁的信号：同时开N个窗口，每个里面还有M个TAB, 不停地追着联接从一个页面跳到另一个页面，焦急地等待下载完成但几乎没有耐心看完整个节目，每隔三秒钟就要瞥一眼＂新邮件＂，等等。。。 实际上，你是回到了很久很久以前非洲大草原上，手拿梭标，既紧张又激动地应对周围的大千世界。你必须对任何的动静都好奇，都敏感。每一个新信号，都是一个未知，可能是危险，也可能是下一顿美餐。你必须快速的做判断做决定，然后丢开，准备好玩下一个游戏。 这说明了为什么小孩子上网跟本不用学，因为接近本能么。小孩子跟小猩猩的精神力水平差不多，只能对一个东西保持半分钟的注意力。而互联网，天生就是为了分散注意力而设计的。 老人上互联网，也有助于防止老年痴呆。上网半小时，对反应，判断，决定等脑力活动的锻炼, 相当与玩一个复杂拼图游戏。 读书的话，却需要功夫和训练，十年寒窗。这个不是我们的错，错就错在读书不"自然"，对人的大脑原本思维方式来说是＂逆天＂的。当然呢，通过训练，我们如果能在闹市中还能物我两忘的＂读进去书＂。那么想必对精神，意志，和注意力提高有好处。 文字书是这么＂逆天＂的媒介，那么它是怎样发展起来的呢？它的兴衰对人类的思维和文化，又意味着什么呢？ (互联网的非洲大草原本质，也有助于我理解为什么善挖坑者能吸引眼球。。。因此我就要去喝口水了。)
个人分类: 读书|1470 次阅读|0 个评论
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