能源研究 为什么中国仍在建设新的燃煤电厂

四角池

Last year, China 去年，中国 started construction on an estimated 95 gigawatts (GW) of new开始建设约95吉瓦（GW）的新coal 煤炭 power capacity, enough to power the entire UK twice over.

去年，中国开始建设预计950亿瓦（GW）的新增煤电装机容量，这一发电量足以满足整个英国两倍的用电需求。

It accounted for 93% of new global coal-power construction in 2024.

2024 年，它占全球新增燃煤电建设的 93%。

The boom appears to contradict China’s climate commitments and its pledge to “strictly control” new coal power.

这种繁荣似乎与中国的气候承诺及其“严格控制” 新燃煤电的承诺相矛盾 。

The fact that China already has significant underused coal power capacity and is adding enough clean energy to cover rising electricity demand also calls the necessity of the buildout into question.

中国已经拥有大量未充分利用的煤电容量，并且正在增加足够的清洁能源来满足不断增长的电力需求，这一事实也使扩建的必要性受到质疑。

Furthermore, so much new coal capacity provides an easy counterargument for claims that China is serious about the energy transition.

此外，如此多的煤炭新增产能为中国认真对待能源转型的说法提供了一个简单的反驳。

Did China really need more coal power?

中国真的需要更多的煤电吗？

And now that it is here, do all these brand-new power plants mean China’s greenhouse gas emissions will remain elevated for longer?

现在已经到来，所有这些全新的发电厂是否意味着中国的温室气体排放量将在更长时间内保持高位？

This article addresses four common talking points surrounding China’s ongoing coal-power expansion, explaining how and why the current wave of new projects might come to an end.

本文探讨了围绕中国正在进行的煤电扩张的四个常见话题，解释了当前新项目浪潮如何以及为何可能结束。

New coal is not needed for energy security 能源安全不需要新煤

The explanation for China’s recent coal boom lies in a combination of policy priorities, institutional incentives and system-level mismatches, with origins in the widespread power shortages China experienced in the early 2020s.

中国近期煤炭繁荣的解释在于政策优先事项、制度激励措施和系统层面的不匹配，其根源在于中国在 2020 年代初经历的普遍电力短缺。

In 2021, a “mismatch” between the price of coal and the government-set price of coal-fired power incentivised coal-fired power plants to cut generation. Furthermore, power shortages in 2020 and 2022 revealed issues of inflexible grid management and limited availability of power plants, when demand spiked due to extreme weather and elevated energy-intensive economic activity, compounded by coal shortages, reduced hydro output and insufficient imported electricity import.

2021 年， 煤炭价格与政府设定的燃煤电价格“ 错配 ”，激励燃煤电厂减产。此外，2020 年和 2022 年的电力短缺暴露了电网管理不灵活和发电厂可用性有限的问题，当时由于极端天气和能源密集型经济活动增加，需求激增，再加上煤炭短缺、水力发电量减少和进口电力进口不足。

Following this, energy security became a top priority for the central government. Local governments responded by approving new coal-power projects as a form of insurance against future outages.

此后，能源安全成为中央政府的重中之重 。地方政府的回应是批准新的燃煤发电项目，作为未来停电的一种保险。

Yet, on paper, China had – and still has – more than enough “dispatchable” resources to meet even the highest demand peaks. (Dispatchable sources include coal, gas, nuclear and hydropower.) It also has more than enough underutilised coal-power capacity to meet potential demand growth.

然而，从纸面上看， 中国拥有——并且仍然拥有——足够的“ 可调度 ”资源来满足即使是最高的需求高峰。（可调度的来源包括煤炭 、天然气、核能和水力发电。它还拥有足够多的未充分利用的煤电容量来满足潜在的需求增长。

A bigger factor behind the shortages was grid inflexibility. During both the 2020 power crisis in north-east China and the 2022 shortage in Sichuan, affected provinces continued to export electricity while experiencing local shortages.短缺背后的一个更大因素是电网不灵活 。在 2020 年东北电力危机和 2022 年四川电力短缺期间，受影响的省份继续出口电力，同时出现局部电力短缺。

A lack of coordination between provinces and inflexible market mechanisms governing the “dispatch” of power plants – the instructions to adjust generation up or down – meant that existing resources could not be fully utilised.各省之间缺乏协调 ，以及管理发电厂 “ 调度 ” 的市场机制不灵活——即调整发电量的 指示—— 意味着现有资源无法得到充分利用。

Nevertheless, with coal power plants cheap to build and quick to gain approval, many provinces saw them as a reliable way to reassure policymakers, balance local grids and support industry interests, regardless of whether the plants would end up being economically viable or frequently used. 然而，由于燃煤电厂的建设成本低廉且获得批准很快，许多省份将其视为安抚政策制定者、平衡当地电网和支持行业利益的可靠方式，无论这些电厂最终是否在经济上可行或经常使用。

China’s average utilisation rate of coal power plants in 2024 was around 50%, meaning total coal-fired electricity generation could rise substantially without the need for any new capacity.2024 年中国燃煤电厂平均利用率约为 50%，这意味着燃煤发电总量可以在不需要任何新容量的情况下大幅增长。

At the same time as adding new coal, the Chinese government also addressed energy security through improvements to grid operation and market reforms, as well as building more storage.在增加新煤炭的同时，中国政府还通过改善电网运营和市场改革以及建设更多储能来解决能源安全问题。

The country added dozens of gigawatts of battery storage, accelerated pumped hydro projects and improved trading linkages between electricity markets in different provinces. 该国增加了数十吉瓦的电池存储， 加速了抽水蓄能项目，并改善了不同省份电力市场之间的贸易联系。

Though these investments could have gone further, they have already helped [url=https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202506/06/content_WS6842875fc6d0868f4e8f31be.html]avoid[/url] blackouts during recent summers – when few of the newly-permitted coal power plants had come online. As such, it is not clear that the new coal plants were needed to guarantee security of supply in the first place.尽管这些投资本可以走得更远，但它们已经帮助[url=https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202506/06/content_WS6842875fc6d0868f4e8f31be.html]避免[/url]了最近夏季的停电——当时新获准的燃煤电厂很少上线。因此，尚不清楚是否首先需要新的燃煤电厂来保证供应安全。

President Xi Jinping has stated that “energy security depends on developing new energy” – using the Chinese term for renewables excluding hydropower and sometimes including nuclear. According to the International Energy Agency, in the long run, resilience will come not from overbuilding coal, but from modernising China’s power system.习近平主席曾表示，“能源安全取决于发展新能源 ”——用中文术语来指代可再生能源，不包括水电， 有时还包括核能。根据国际能源署的说法，从长远来看，韧性将不是来自过度建设煤炭 ，而是来自中国电力系统现代化。

New coal power plants do not mean more coal use and higher emissions 新建燃煤电厂并不意味着更多的煤炭使用和更高的排放

It may seem intuitive to imagine that if a country is building new coal power plants, it will automatically burn more coal and increase its emissions.人们很直观地想象，如果一个国家正在建造新的燃煤电厂 ，它会自动燃烧更多的煤炭并增加排放量。

But adding capacity does not necessarily translate into higher generation or emissions, particularly while the growth of clean energy is still accelerating.但增加产能并不一定意味着更高的发电量或排放量，尤其是在清洁能源的增长仍在加速的情况下。

Coal power generation plays a residual role in China’s power system, filling the gap between the power generated from clean energy sources – such as wind, solar, hydro and nuclear – and total electricity demand. As clean-energy generation is growing rapidly, the space left for coal to fill is shrinking.燃煤发电在中国电力系统中发挥着残余作用，填补了风能、太阳能、水力和核 能等清洁能源 发电量与总电力需求之间的缺口。随着清洁能源发电的快速增长， 留给煤炭填充的空间正在缩小。

From December 2024, coal power generation declined for five straight months before ticking up slightly in May and June, mainly to offset weaker hydropower generation due to drought. Coal power generation was flat overall in the second quarter of 2025.自 2024 年 12 月起， 燃煤发电量连续五个月下降 ，随后在 5 月和 6 月略有上升，主要是为了抵消干旱导致的水力发电量疲软。2025 年第二季度燃煤发电量总体持平。

The chart below shows growth in monthly power generation for coal and gas (grey), solar and wind (dark blue) and other low-carbon power sources (light blue).下图显示了煤炭和天然气（灰色）、太阳能和风能（深蓝色）以及其他低碳能源 （浅蓝色）的月发电量增长情况。

This illustrates how the rise in wind and solar growth is squeezing the residual demand left for coal power, resulting in declining coal-power output during much of 2025 to date.这说明风能和太阳能增长的上升如何挤压了剩余的煤电需求，导致 2025 年迄今为止的大部分时间里煤电发电量下降。

Growth in monthly electricity generation in China by source, terawatt hours (TWh). Source: CREA.中国按来源划分的月发电量增长，太瓦时 （TWh)。资料来源：CREA。

Another way to consider the impact of new coal-fired capacity is to test whether, in reality, it automatically leads to a rise in coal-fired electricity generation.考虑新燃煤发电容量影响的另一种方法是测试它是否在现实中自动导致燃煤发电量的增加。

The top panel in the figure below shows the annual increase in coal power capacity on the horizontal axis, relative to the change in coal-power output on the vertical axis.下图的顶部面板显示了横轴上煤电容量的年增长量，相对于纵轴上煤电出力的变化。

For example, in 2023, China added 47GW of new coal capacity and coal power output rose by 3.4TWh. In contrast, only 28GW was added in 2021, yet output still rose by 4.4TWh.例如，2023 年 ，中国新增煤炭装机 47GW， 煤电发电量增长 3.4TWh。相比之下，2021 年仅新增 28GW，但产量仍增长 4.4TWh。

In other words, there is no correlation between the amount of new coal capacity and the change in electricity generation from coal, or the associated emissions, on an annual basis.换句话说， 新增煤炭装机容量与煤炭发电量或相关排放量的年度变化之间没有相关性。

Indeed, the lower panel in the figure shows that larger additions of coal capacity are often followed by falling utilisation. This means that adding coal plants tends to mean that the coal fleet overall is simply used less often.事实上，图中的下图显示， 煤炭产能的增加往往伴随着利用率的下降。这意味着增加燃煤电厂往往意味着整个燃煤电厂的使用频率降低。

Top: Annual change in coal power generation, TWh, relative to the change in coal power capacity, GW, with trend line. Bottom: Change in capacity utilisation, %, relative to the change in capacity, with trend line. Source: CREA.上图： 燃煤发电量年变化（TWh）相对于煤电容量变化（GW），呈趋势线。底部：产能利用率变化，%，相对于产能变化，带趋势线。资料来源：CREA。

As such, while adding new coal plants might complicate the energy transition and may increase the risk of unnecessary greenhouse gas emissions, an increase in coal use is far from guaranteed.因此，虽然增加新的燃煤电厂可能会使能源转型复杂化，并可能增加不必要的温室气体排放风险，但煤炭使用量的增加远未得到保证。

If instead, clean energy is covering all new demand – as it has been recently – then building new coal plants simply means that the coal fleet will be increasingly underutilised, which poses a threat to plant profitability.相反，清洁能源正在满足所有新需求—— 就像最近 一样——那么建造新的燃煤电厂仅仅意味着燃煤机队将越来越未得到充分利用，这对电厂的盈利能力构成威胁。

China is not unique in its approach to coal power 中国在煤电方面的做法并非独一无二

The dynamics behind last year’s surge in coal power project construction starts speak to the logic of China’s system, in which cost-efficiency is not always a central concern when ensuring that key problems are solved.去年煤电项目开工量激增背后的动态说明了中国体系的逻辑 ，在确保关键问题得到解决时，成本效益并不总是核心问题。

If a combination of three tools – coal power plants, storage and grid flexibility, in this case – can solve a problem more reliably than one alone, then China is likely to deploy all three, even at the risk of overcapacity. 如果燃煤电厂 、储能和电网灵活性这三种工具的组合能够比单独使用一种工具更可靠地解决问题，那么中国很可能会同时部署这三种工具，即使冒着产能过剩的风险。

This approach reflects not just a desire for reliability, but also deeper institutional dynamics that help to explain why coal power continues to be built.这种方法不仅反映了对可靠性的渴望，还反映了更深层次的制度动态，有助于解释为什么继续建设煤电 。

But that does not mean that such a pattern is unique to China.但这并不意味着这种模式是中国独有的。

The figure below shows that, across 26 regions, a peak in coal-fired electricity generation (blue lines) almost always comes before coal power capacity (red) starts to decline.下图显示，在 26 个地区， 燃煤发电量（蓝线）几乎总是在煤电容量（红线）开始下降之前达到峰值。

Moreover, the data suggests that once there has been a peak, generation falls much more sharply than capacity, implying that remaining coal plants are kept on the system even as they are used increasingly infrequently.此外，数据表明，一旦出现峰值，发电量下降幅度远大于产能，这意味着剩余的燃煤电厂即使使用频率越来越低，仍保留在系统上。

Coal-fired power capacity, GW (blue) and generation, TWh (red) across 26 regions, 2000-2024. Source: Ember.2000-2024 年，26 个地区的燃煤发电容量 GW（蓝色）和发电量 TWh（红色)。资料来源：余烬。

In most cases, what ultimately stopped new coal power projects in those countries was not a formal ban, but the market reality that they were no longer needed once lower-carbon technologies and efficiency gains began to cover demand growth. 在大多数情况下，最终阻止这些国家新燃煤发电项目的不是正式的禁令，而是市场现实 ，即一旦低碳技术和效率提高开始满足需求增长，就不再需要这些项目。

Coal phase-out policies have tended to reinforce these shifts, rather than initiating them. In China, the same market signals are emerging: clean energy is now meeting all incremental demand and coal power generation has, as a result, started to decline.煤炭淘汰政策往往会强化这些转变，而不是引发这些转变。在中国 ，同样的市场信号正在出现：清洁能源现在满足了所有增量需求，而燃煤发电量因此开始下降。

Coal is not yet playing a flexible ‘supporting’ role 煤炭尚未发挥灵活的“支撑”作用

Since 2022, China’s energy policy has stated that new coal-power projects should serve a “supporting” or “regulating” role, helping integrate variable renewables and respond to demand fluctuations, rather than operating as always-on “baseload” generators. 自 2022 年以来， 中国的能源政策提出， 新建煤电项目应发挥“支撑”或“调节”作用，帮助整合可变可再生能源并应对需求波动，而不是作为永远在线的“ 基负荷 ”发电机运行。

More broadly, China’s energy strategy also calls for coal power to gradually shift away from a dominant baseload role toward a more flexible, supporting function.更广泛地说， 中国的能源战略还要求煤电逐渐从主导的基本负荷角色转向更灵活的辅助功能。

These shifts have, however, mostly happened on paper. Coal power overall remains dominant in China’s power mix and largely inflexible in how it is dispatched. 然而，这些转变大多发生在纸面上。 煤电总体上在中国的电力结构中仍然占主导地位，并且在调度方式上基本上缺乏灵活性。

The 2022 policy provided local governments with a new rationale for building coal power, but many of the new plants are still designed and operated as inflexible baseload units. Long-term contracts and guaranteed operating hours often support these plants to run frequently, undermining the idea that they are just backups.2022 年的政策为地方政府建设煤电提供了新的理由，但许多新电厂仍作为不灵活的基本负荷机组进行设计和运营 。 长期合同和有保证的运行时间通常支持这些工厂频繁运行，从而破坏了它们只是备用的想法。

Old coal plants also continue to operate under traditional baseload assumptions. Despite policies promoting retrofits to improve flexibility, coal power remains structurally rigid. 旧燃煤电厂也继续在传统的基本负荷假设下运行。尽管政策提倡改造以提高灵活性，但煤电在结构上仍然僵化。

Technical limitations, long-term contracts and economic incentives continue to prevent meaningful change. Coal is unlikely to shift into the flexible supporting role that China says it wants without deeper reform to dispatch rules, pricing mechanisms and contract structures.技术限制、长期合同和经济激励措施继续阻碍有意义的变革。 如果不对调度规则、定价机制和合同结构进行更深入的改革，煤炭不太可能转变为中国所希望的灵活支持角色。

Despite all this, China is seeing a clear shift away from coal. Clean-energy installations have surged, while power demand growth has moderated. 尽管如此， 中国正在看到明显的摆脱煤炭的转变。清洁能源装机量激增 ，而电力需求增长放缓 。

As a result, coal power’s share in the electricity mix has steadily declined, dropping from around 73% in 2016 to 51% in June 2025. The chart below shows the monthly power generation share of coal (dark grey), gas (light grey), solar and wind (dark blue), and other low-carbon sources (light blue) from 2016 to the present. 因此， 煤电在电力结构中的份额稳步下降 ，从 2016 年的 73% 左右下降到 2025 年 6 月的 51%。下图显示了 2016 年至今煤炭（深灰色）、天然气（浅灰色）、太阳能和风能（深蓝色）以及其他低碳能源（浅蓝色）的月度发电份额。

Share of monthly electricity generation in China by source, %. Source: CREA.按来源划分的中国月发电量份额，%。资料来源：CREA。

When will the coal boom end? 煤炭繁荣何时结束？

About a decade ago, the end of China’s coal power expansion also looked near. Coal power plant utilisation declined sharply in the mid-2010s as overcapacity worsened. In response, the government began restricting new project approvals in 2016. 大约十年前， 中国煤电扩张的尾声也即将结束 。2010 年代中期，由于产能过剩的恶化， 燃煤电厂的利用率急剧下降 。作为回应，政府于 2016 年开始限制新项目的批准。

With new construction slowing and power demand rebounding, especially during and after the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, utilisation rates recovered. Not long after, power shortages kicked off the recent coal building spree.随着新建筑放缓和电力需求反弹，特别是在 Covid-19 大流行最严重期间和之后，利用率有所回升 。不久之后， 电力短缺引发了最近的燃煤建筑热潮。

Now, there are new signs that the coal power boom is approaching its end. Permitting is becoming more selective again in some regions, especially in eastern provinces where demand growth is slowing and clean energy is surging. Meanwhile, system flexibility is advancing. 现在，有新的迹象表明 ，煤电热潮即将结束。在一些地区，许可再次变得更加有选择性 ，特别是在需求增长放缓、清洁能源激增的东部省份。与此同时，系统灵活性正在提高 。

Compared to the late 2010s, the current shift appears more structural. It is driven by the rapid expansion of clean energy, which increasingly eliminates the need for large-scale new coal power projects.与 2010 年代后期相比，当前的转变似乎更具结构性 。这是由清洁能源快速扩张推动的，这越来越消除了对大型新燃煤电项目的需求。

Still, the pace of change will depend on how quickly institutions adapt. If grid operators become confident that peak loads can reliably be met with renewables and flexible backup, the rationale for new coal power plants will weaken. 尽管如此 ，变革的速度将取决于机构适应的速度。如果电网运营商确信可再生能源和灵活备用能源可以可靠地满足峰值负荷，那么新建燃煤电厂的理由就会减弱。

Equally important, entrenched interests at the provincial and corporate levels continue to push for new plants, not just as insurance, but as sources of investment, employment and revenue. Through long-term contracts and utilisation guarantees, this represents institutional lock-in that may delay the shift away from coal.同样重要的是，省级和企业层面的根深蒂固的利益集团继续推动新工厂的建设 ，这不仅是作为保险，而且是投资、就业和收入的来源 。通过长期合同和利用保证，这代表了制度锁定，可能会延迟从煤炭的转变。

The next major turning point will come when coal power utilisation rates begin to fall more sharply and persistently. With large amounts of capacity set to come online in the next two years and clean energy steadily displacing coal in the power mix, a sharp drop in coal power plant utilisation appears likely.下一个重大转折点将到来，煤电利用率开始大幅度和持续下降。随着未来两年大量产能上线，清洁能源在电力结构中稳步取代煤炭 ，燃煤电厂的利用率似乎可能会急剧下降。

Once this happens, the central government might be expected to step in through administrative capacity cuts – forcing the oldest plants to retire – just as it did during overcapacity campaigns in the steel, cement and coal sectors around 2016 and 2017. 一旦发生这种情况，中央政府可能会通过行政产能削减来介入——迫使最老的工厂退役 ——就像它在 2016 年和 2017 年左右钢铁、水泥和煤炭行业的产能过剩运动中所做的那样。

In that sense, China’s coal power phase-out may not begin with a single grand policy declaration, but with a familiar pattern of centralised control and managed retrenchment.从这个意义上说， 中国的煤电淘汰可能不是从一个宏大的政策宣言开始的，而是从一种熟悉的集中控制和管理紧缩模式开始的。

A key question is how quickly institutional incentives and grid operation will catch up with the dawning reality of coal being squeezed by renewable growth, as well as whether they will allow clean energy to lead, or continue to be held back by the legacy of coal. 一个关键问题是，制度激励措施和电网运营将多快赶上煤炭受到可再生能源增长挤压的曙光现实，以及它们是否会让清洁能源引领，还是继续受到煤炭遗产的阻碍。

The upcoming 15th five-year plan presents a crucial test of government priorities in this area. If it wants to bring policy back in line with its long-term climate and energy goals, then it could consider including clear, measurable targets for phasing down coal consumption and limiting new capacity, for example.即将到来的 “十五五”规划是对政府在这一领域的优先事项的关键考验。如果它想使政策重新符合其长期气候和能源目标，那么它可以考虑包括明确的、可衡量的目标，例如逐步减少煤炭消费和限制新产能。

While China’s coal power construction boom looks, at first glance, like a resurgence,it currently appears more likely to be the final surge before a long downturn. The expansion has added friction and complexity to China’s energy transition, but it has not reversed it.虽然乍一看， 中国的煤电建设热潮似乎是复苏，但目前看来更有可能是长期低迷之前的最后一次激增。这种扩张给中国的能源转型增加了摩擦和复杂性，但并没有扭转局面。