日志
总理和尼克松谈日本
热度 12
What did richard nixon say to zhou enlai about the american troops in japan.
121982.pdf
Let me use one other example to bear out my argument that a U.S. presence in Asia is in the interest of not just the U.S. but in the interest of China. I think that the Prime Minister in terms of his philosophy has taken exactly the correct position with respect to Japan, for example the U.S. should withdraw its troops, the Treaty between Japan and the U.S. should be abrogated, and Japan should be left to become a neutral country that is unarmed. I think that the Prime Minister has to continue to say that. But I want him to understand why I think strongly that our policy with respect to Japan is in the security interest of his country even though it is opposed to the philosophic doctrine which he espouses.(翻译，都是千年的狐狸，跟我玩什么聊斋啊)
On the other hand, Japan has the option of moving toward China and it also has the option of moving toward the Soviet Union.
So the point I would summarize on is this. I can say, and I think the Prime Minister will believe me, that the U.S. has no designs on China, that the U.S. will use its influence with Japan and those other countries where we have a defense relationship or provide economic assistance, to discourage policies which would be detrimental to China. But if the U.S. is gone from Asia, gone from Japan, our protests, no matter how loud, would be like—to use the Prime Minister's phrase—firing an empty cannon; we would have no rallying effect because fifteen thousand miles away is just too far to be heard. （翻译，真理只在大炮的射程之内）
Now I realize that I have painted here a picture which makes me sound like an old cold warrior (Prime Minister Chou laughs翻译：我信你个鬼 你个糟老头子坏得很). But it is the world as I see it, and when we analyze it, it is what brings us, China and America, together; not in terms of philosophy, not in terms of friendship— although I believe that is important—but because of national security I believe our interests are in common in the respects I have mentioned.
I will just close by saying that after this analysis I would not want to leave the impression that the U.S. is not going to try to go to the source of the trouble, the Soviet Union, and try to make any agreements that will reduce the common danger. Our policy will be completely open and frank with China. Since Dr. Kissinger's visit, we have informed his (Prime Minister Chou's) government completely with respect to the contacts we have had with the Soviets. When we have had my meeting in Moscow, if the Prime Minister agrees, I would like to have Dr. Kissinger come and report personally to the Prime Minister on what we have discussed and what agreements we reached in Moscow. We are going to try, for example, to get an arms limitation agreement and also make progress on the Middle East if that subject is still before us.
But the most important fact to bear in mind is that as far as China and the U.S. are concerned, if the U.S. were to follow a course of weakening its defense, of withdrawing totally or almost exclusively into the U.S., the world would be much more dangerous in my view. The U.S. has no aggressive intent against any other country; we have made our mistakes in the past. And I do not charge that the Soviet Union has any aggressive interests against any other country in the world, but in terms of the safety of these nations which are not superpowers in the world, they will be much safer if there are two superpowers, rather than just one.
I have taken too much of the Prime Minister's time, but I wanted him to get the feel of my general philosophy on these points.
Prime Minister Chou: (in English): Thank you. 
（翻译，让我们进入下一个问题）
（翻译，让我们进入下一个问题）(Prime Minister Chou then suggested a ten minute recess and the President agreed this was a
good idea. During the recess, from 3:50 to 4:00 p.m. there was light talk, including the difficulty of
translating Chairman Mao's poems.)
